Measuring Externalities in Program Evaluation by Janssens, Wendy
TI 2005-017/2 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
   
Measuring Externalities in Program 
Evaluation  
 Wendy Janssens 
 
General & Development Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute. 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-
scientific nature to driessen@tinbergen.nl. 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
 1
Measuring Externalities in Program Evaluation 
 
Spillover effects of a women’s empowerment programme in rural India 
 
 
 
Wendy Janssens1 
 
March 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Impact evaluations of development programmes usually focus on a comparison of 
participants with a control group. However, if the programme generates externalities 
for non-participants such an approach will capture only part of the programme’s 
impact. Based on a unique large-scale quantitative survey we estimate the direct as 
well as the spillover effects of a women’s empowerment programme in rural India on 
child immunization and school enrolment. The survey covers both participants and 
non-participants living in programme villages, as well as respondents in control 
villages where the programme is not yet active. We account for participation selection 
bias using instrumental variables. The control villages allow us to test the exclusion 
restriction and provide us with an effective control group to analyze programme 
impact. We find both direct effects and significant spillovers on non-participants. The 
impact of interventions might be substantially underestimated if such external effects 
were not taken into account.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Impact evaluations are generally based on a comparison of the treatment group with a 
control group. However, if the project generates externalities and the control group 
benefits from the programme as well, such an approach might seriously underestimate 
the programme’s impact. We examine the impact of Mahila Samakhya, a women’s 
empowerment programme in the North-Indian state Bihar, on child outcomes. We 
focus explicitly on the spillover effects of the programme on children of non-
participants who live in a village where the programme is active.  
 
Bihar is one of the poorest states of India with very low educational and child health 
indicators. It is a predominantly rural state with a large and rapidly growing 
population of almost 83 million people. Society is very caste-conscious and gender 
biased, and still marked by the former feudal practices of bonded labor. The poor 
social conditions in Bihar are accompanied by severe material poverty for a majority 
of the population. Almost two thirds of all people, 64%, lived below the poverty line 
of US$1 per day in 1993/1994, a very large proportion compared to the national 
average of 36% (World Bank, 1997). In addition, the population is confronted with a 
poor state of infrastructure and social services that exacerbate the difficult 
circumstances. 
 
The strong social stratification and the gender bias result in substantial disadvantage 
in primary school access and learning for children from the lowest castes and for girls. 
Enrolment is low, drop out and retention rates are high and learning achievement of 
those completing primary school is very low (World Bank, 1997). This leads to the 
lowest literacy levels of the entire country. The overall literacy rate in Bihar is only 
48% compared to the national literacy rate of 65%2. Disaggregation by gender shows 
that 60% of the male population in Bihar can read and write, but only 34% of the 
female population. The immunization rates show a similar picture. In 1998/1999, only 
11% of all Bihari children aged 12 to 23 months were fully immunized compared to a 
national full immunization rate of 42%3. 
 
Under these circumstances, the Mahila Samakhya programme (literally `women 
interacting as equals') aims to educate and empower women in rural areas, especially 
women from socially and economically marginalized groups, such as women 
belonging to the Scheduled Castes4. The women are encouraged to set up women's 
groups in their communities to improve their own lives. The programme offers 
training and support to the groups. Improving the education and health of children are 
important components of the group activities.  
 
This paper evaluates the impact of the Mahila Samakhya programme on child 
outcomes in three districts of Bihar.5 The evaluation is based on a unique data set 
                                                          
2 India Census Office (2001a, 2001b). Literacy rates are calculated over the population aged 6 years 
and older.  
3 National Human Development Report 2001 (Government of India, 2002). 
4 Scheduled Castes is a classification in the Indian Constitution. ‘Dalit’ or ‘Harijan’ are other often 
used terms to refer to the Scheduled Castes. Many of these people were considered to be 
‘untouchables’ in India for centuries (Ramachandran, 1998, p.71). 
5 For a recent overview of impact evaluations of community-based development projects, see Mansuri 
and Rao (2004). 
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encompassing 1991 women in 102 villages. In 74 of these villages the programme is 
active, in the remaining 28 villages the programme has not started yet. These latter 
villages will be used as control group. Due to the slow scaling up of the Mahila 
Samakhya programme, the matched control villages are highly similar to the 
programme villages, thereby providing for a good counterfactual.6  
 
Within the programme villages, both participants and non-participating women were 
interviewed. This sample design allows us not only to compare the outcomes of 
participants with those of non-participants in the programme villages, but also to 
examine the externalities of the programme through a comparison of non-participants 
in programme villages with the control group. Although a comparison of child 
outcomes at the village level captures the overall programme impact within the 
community, it will not provide insights in the potential presence and size of 
externalities. 
 
A growing body of literature emphasizes the role of social interactions in shaping 
environments and outcomes. There is increasing evidence of the influence of 
neighborhoods and peers on outcomes such as child health and behavior (Case and 
Katz, 1991; Katz et al., 2001), student outcomes (Lalive and Cattaneo, 2004; 
Sacerdote, 2001), technology adoption in agriculture (Besley and Case, 1994; Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004), retirement plan decisions (Duflo and Saez, 
2002) and contraceptive prevalence (Munshi and Myaux, 2002). 
 
However, very few impact evaluations of development programmes explicitly take 
into account the potential presence of local spillover effects.7 For example, Alderman 
et al. (2003) and Kim et al. (1999) measure the increased enrolment of boys after the 
introduction of girls’ primary school programs in Pakistan. Bobonis and Finan (2002) 
measure increased enrolment of children from households not eligible in the 
PROGRESA programme in Mexico. Miguel and Kremer (2004) measure externalities 
of a deworming programme in Kenya due to reduced disease transmission on children 
attending neighboring schools. These evaluations use the random characteristics or 
the eligibility criteria of the programme to identify the spillover effects.  
 
However, when implementation is not random or participation is voluntary and open 
to all, identification of the treatment effect becomes more problematic (Manski, 1993; 
2000). It is usually difficult to plausibly argue that the exclusion restriction for the 
instrumental variables holds. In this paper, we propose a different test of the exclusion 
restriction that exploits our survey design. The control group allows us to test directly 
whether the instruments can be excluded from the outcome equation. An estimation of 
the treatment effects using propensity score matching provides additional support to 
the results.  
 
The results show that the programme has a significant positive impact on 
immunization rates and preschool and school enrolment rates when one of the female 
household members participates in a Mahila Samakhya women’s group. Moreover, 
the spillover effects on children living in programme villages, but whose mother does 
                                                          
6 Duflo (2003) discusses the potential contribution of scaling up to programme evaluation design. 
7 Impact evaluations that account for general equilibrium effects are more common. For an overview of 
analyses of general equilibrium effects in training and labour market policies, see Heckman et al. 
(1999).  
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not participate herself, are substantial, especially for girls and children belong to the 
Scheduled Castes. These results emphasize the importance of using the right control 
group in an impact evaluation, especially if the programme focuses on awareness 
raising and collective action. A comparison of participants with the control group 
only, would have missed to measure the spillover effects within the village. The 
omission of the control villages in the survey would have led to a double 
underestimation of the programme effects because the outcomes of participating 
households would have been compared with the improved outcomes of non-
participants.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the Mahila 
Samakhya programme and its objectives. A comparison of participants with non-
participants in programme villages shows that the programme reaches especially those 
women that belong to marginal groups in society. The third section discusses the 
sample selection and data collection procedures. It also compares the characteristics 
of programme villages and control villages in the sample and argues that the control 
villages form a good counterfactual. The fourth section gives a description of the 
primary statistics and differences in immunization and enrolment rates for the 
different sample groups. Fifth, we will outline the estimation model and examine the 
underlying assumptions implicit in the various estimators of the programme effects. In 
the subsequent section we will discuss the econometric results of both the two-stage 
instrumental variables estimation and the propensity score matching. The final section 
concludes. 
 
2. Description of the programme 
2.1 Programme objectives and characteristics 
The Government of India launched the Mahila Samakhya programme in 1988 to 
support its 1986 New Policy of Education. The programme is currently active in nine 
states8. The Mahila Samakhya programme was introduced in the state of Bihar in 
1992. In March 2002 the programme was operational in 7 out of the 37 districts of 
Bihar. 1890 women's groups were active, covering more than fifty thousand women.  
 
Because of its inclusion as a component in educational programmes, Mahila 
Samakhya in Bihar initially aimed at educational issues. The participating women 
obtained literacy and numerical skills, were motivated to increase school enrolment of 
their children, especially their daughters, and to become active members of Village 
Education Committees.  
 
The Mahila Samakhya programme emphasizes the process of empowerment, instead 
of the fulfillment of targets. It seeks to bring about a change in women's perceptions 
about themselves and their own abilities, and the perceptions of society with respect 
                                                          
8 The national Department of Education organizes the Mahila Samakhya programme at the national 
level. At the state levels, the programme is implemented through autonomous Mahila Samakhya 
Societies. Mahila Samakhya in Bihar started as a component of the Unicef-sponsored Bihar Education 
Project (BEP). From 1998 to 2003, the programme in Bihar was financed through the World Bank-
sponsored Third District Primary Eduction Project (DPEP III) and currently it is part of the national 
Sarva Shiksha Abhijan programme (Movement for Education for All). The national Department of 
Education organizes the Mahila Samakhya programme at the national level. At the state levels, the 
programme is implemented through autonomous Mahila Samakhya Societies. 
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to women's traditional roles.9 The programme does not prescribe the kind of activities 
that a group has to engage in. Instead, it aims to assist the women in their own 
solutions for problems. It offers training in a large number of areas and enables the 
groups to effectively access and utilize resources and government subsidies. As a 
result, the groups have taken additional initiatives over time to address a wide range 
of issues. These range from meeting daily minimum needs through savings and credit 
groups or income-generating activities, obtaining better health and hygiene 
knowledge, entering local politics, improving village level infrastructure, settling 
conflicts in the village, and setting up informal preschools and primary schools for 
girls (Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
 
The facilitators of Mahila Samakhya are responsible for the initial mobilization of 
women into a group. This is a slow process. The Mahila Samakhya programme does 
not offer clear-cut and immediate benefits. These should be produced by the groups 
themselves, albeit with support of the programme. Moreover, for many villagers the 
idea of women’s empowerment seems in conflict with their traditional way of life. 
Through regular visits to the women's homes, the fields and their work place, the 
facilitator tries to gain trust among the women. During these visits she talks and 
listens to them and assists in solving small issues. The initial discussions in the group 
are for many participants the first time that they reflect on their situation and articulate 
their needs (Mahila Samakhya, 1995). As the group gets stronger, it starts to set its 
own agenda and meeting times, and the facilitator will participate less in meetings. 
This process usually takes 6 to12 months.10 
 
2.2 Comparison of participants with non-participants 
 
The group sizes in the three districts under study range from ten to eighty members 
with an average of twenty members. This represents between 1% and 26% of the total 
adult female population in a village (5.4% on average). In principle every woman who 
is interested can join the women's group. However, the facilitators gear their efforts 
particularly towards poor women from the Scheduled or Other Backward Castes. 
Table 1 provides a description of the population and community variables.11  As table 
2 indicates the majority of the participants belongs to the target group. Of the 
participants, 39% belong to the Scheduled Castes and 49% to the Other Backward 
Castes. Only 2% of the participants come from General Castes. The percentage 
Muslim population is a bit higher among non-participants with 11.6% as compared to 
                                                          
9 A large number of women’s empowerment programmes aim to address the disadvantaged position of 
women in Indian society. See for example Patel (1998) for an analysis of the relationship between the 
women’s movement and women’s education. Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta (2002) provide a discussion of 
the effectiveness of state initiatives on rural women’s empowerment. Purushothaman (1998) gives a 
thorough case study of an informal network of NGOS and women’s collectives, comparable to the 
Mahila Samakhya women’s groups, in the Indian state Maharashtra. Agarwal (2001) analyses how 
seemingly participatory institutions and community groups in India can nonetheless exclude women to 
a significant extent. 
10 Data are calculated based on the data collection at the Mahila Samakhya district offices in 2003. 
11 All descriptive statistics take into account the survey design through appropriate weighting of 
observations. We correct for the stratification in weights and standard errors. Moreover, weights and 
standard errors are adjusted for the clustering at the village level and the fact that villages were not 
sampled proportionate to size. Finally, appropriate weighting of the households takes into account the 
disproportionate sampling of participating and non-participating households in programme villages. 
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9.2% of the participants although the difference is statistically insignificant. The rest 
of the population is in large majority Hindu. 
  
The average participant has lower income than the average non-participant, and lower 
average land ownership. Participants live in houses with walls, floors, and roofs of 
lesser quality. They have less access to private water facilities or electricity. They 
more often use biomass as fuel for cooking. Participants also have less access to 
adequate sanitation facilities. However, the availability of sanitation is alarmingly low 
overall. Only 17% of the population in the study area have access to sanitation 
facilities such as a pit toilet or a latrine. 
 
As table 2 shows, participants live in households with on average significantly less 
education than non-participants. Participants have slightly fewer household members 
but more children under the age of 14, resulting in a larger child dependency ratio for 
participants than for non-participants. The percentage of female-headed households is 
equal among the two groups. 
     
In sum, women who decide to join a women's group belong to the poorer and socially 
more disadvantaged segments of society. In terms of child outcomes, we would 
expect their families to have lower enrolment and immunization rates relative to non-
participants. On the other hand, participation in the programme is voluntary. There 
might be unobserved differences between participants and non-participants in terms of 
motivation, awareness or ability that both affect the likelihood that a woman 
participates and the education or health outcomes of her children. A comparison of 
participating households with non-participating households, even when controlling for 
observed characteristics such as income or caste could potentially be biased due to 
this self-selection into the programme.  
 
Participation selection bias is a key problem in impact evaluation, and will be 
corrected for using instrumental variables. However, before the programme starts the 
awareness about child development is very limited overall and especially among the 
target group.12 Given the fact that it takes about nine months for the facilitators to 
convince women to organize, it seems likely that their interest in child issues 
increases mainly after the first contact with Mahila Samakhya officers. Nonetheless, 
we will correct for potential individual differences in motivation. 
 
3. Sample selection methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
The study encompasses three districts in the north of Bihar: Sitamarhi, Muzaffarpur 
and Darbhanga. In these districts, the Mahila Samakhya programme has been active 
since 1992, 1993 and 1998 respectively. In each of the districts, groups exist that have 
just started and groups from the early years.  
 
Of the three districts, Muzaffarpur is closest to the capital and relatively well 
connected by rail and road. It is one of the centers of political activity in Bihar. It has 
the highest overall and female literacy rates of the three districts (48.2% and 35.2% 
                                                          
12  Based on interviews with Mahila Samakhya programme officials in October 2002 and during the 
field survey from March to June 2003.  
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respectively). It also has the highest percentage of Scheduled Castes population. 
Sitamarhi, south of the border with Nepal, is the most rural of the three with highest 
population growth, lowest sex ratio and lowest literacy rates (39.4% overall and 
26.4% female). The district is relatively isolated and suffers from severe floods every 
year, resulting in seasonal mass migration. Darbhanga's situation lies somewhere in 
between. It is better connected than Sitamarhi, suffers more from floods than 
Muzaffarpur and has an overall literacy rate of 44.3% and a female literacy rate of 
30.4%. Darbhanga has a relatively large Muslim population compared to the other 
two districts (India Census Office, 2001b). 
 
The survey is based on a two-stage stratified clustered sample design. The sample 
consists of six strata: programme and control villages in each of the three districts. In 
the first stage, we randomly selected 25 programme villages in each district from the 
list of programme villages and 10 control villages in each district from control 
blocks13. These villages are the 'clusters'. In the second stage, we randomly selected 
20 households in each village. To ensure a sufficiently large sample of participants in 
each village, we randomly selected 10 non-participating households in programme 
villages and 10 participating women. In control villages, 20 households were selected. 
The final sample consists of 74 programme villages and 28 control villages, 718 
respondents participating in the programme, 714 respondents living in programme 
villages but not participating themselves (nor anyone from their household), and 559 
control respondents living in villages where the programme is not active.14 
 
The Mahila Samakhya programme usually starts in a few blocks per district. Only 
after these blocks are (almost) fully covered, that is, when facilitators have visited 
almost all villages, the programme expands to new blocks in the district. The 
programme focuses on districts and on blocks within districts that are particularly 
disadvantaged. The general selection criteria of Mahila Samakhya for programme 
blocks are threefold: a low level of female literacy, a high percentage of population 
living below the poverty line, and a high percentage of population belonging to the 
Scheduled Castes. Eventually, the programme aims to cover all blocks entirely. Table 
3 gives an overview of the number of blocks and villages covered in the three 
districts. 
 
The Muzaffarpur district office follows the general selection rule for blocks. In 
Sitamarhi on the other hand, the programme has started in most blocks at the same 
time, but it is active in only a limited number of villages in each block. Darbhanga is 
another exception. The programme started only recently in this district. Based on 
travel considerations it chose the two blocks that are closest to the district capital.  
 
All program blocks in Darbhanga and Sitamarhi are selected in the survey sample. In 
Muzaffarpur only the three initial blocks are included, as the other two blocks were 
entered very recently. As control blocks, we choose blocks that are comparable in 
                                                          
13 The administrative structure divides States in districts, districts in blocks, and blocks in revenue 
villages. Revenue villages cover one or a few villages dependent on their size. 
14 Three villages and an additional 49 interviews were dropped from the sample because of incomplete 
or unreliable data. This represents 3% of the sampled villages and 5% of the sampled households. In 
these villages, the supervisor of the interviewers had not been present during the survey resulting in 
problems with the questionnaires. It is not likely that the omission of these particular observations from 
the sample leads to a sample bias. 
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selection criteria to the programme blocks in each district. In Muzaffarpur, the two 
control blocks are relatively similar in the key selection indicators to the programme 
blocks. In Darbhanga, we choose the two next closest blocks to the district capital to 
serve as control group. For Sitamarhi, the three blocks where no or only a few groups 
have been started so far will serve as a control. 
 
Within programme blocks, all villages are eligible for the programme. The process of 
village selection is as follows. The Mahila Samakhya programme announces the 
vacancy of facilitator jobs. Facilitators start with the mobilization process in their own 
village and four neighboring villages. After one year, they expand their working area 
to five additional villages in the block that score high on the Mahila Samakhya 
selection criteria. Due to difficult travel circumstances, in Darbhanga all ten villages 
lie close to the facilitator's own village.  
    
3.2 Data collection 
 
Data collection occurred in two phases. A first exploratory field visit took place in 
October 2002. During this visit Mahila Samakhya officials and facilitators were 
interviewed as well as women's groups in the field. These interviews were qualitative 
and served as inputs into the design of two questionnaires: one household 
questionnaire and one village questionnaire. The village questionnaire contains a 
general part on village facilities and characteristics, and a separate module on the 
women's groups. These were administered to the women's groups. In control villages, 
village leaders and other community members were interviewed for the first general 
village section only. After a pilot of the questionnaires, the actual data collection took 
place from March to June 2003.  
 
3.3 Comparison of programme and control villages 
 
To what extent do the control villages represent a good counterfactual for the 
programme villages? As described in section 3.1 the control villages are chosen from 
blocks that are comparable in selection criteria to the programme blocks. The slow 
scaling up of the programme within districts indeed offers the opportunity of 
constructing an adequate control group, as we will argue in the current section.  
 
A comparison of the village characteristics in these control and programme blocks is 
given in table 4. Panel A of the table looks at population characteristics within control 
and programme villages respectively. These relate to household caste and religion, 
household income and wealth measures, household education variables and 
characteristics regarding the composition of the household. The differences between 
the two groups are small and highly insignificant for all characteristics.15 Note that the 
recruitment method for facilitators could potentially have favored the villages with a 
higher female literacy rate in the programme blocks, since those villages might be 
more likely to provide suitable applicants for the job. However, we do not find a 
systematic difference in female education between programme and control villages. 
                                                          
15 The results in table 4 panel A are based on a comparison of the total population in programme 
villages with the total population in control villages. Results are highly similar when we first calculate 
the average household characteristics per village and then compare the programme village averages 
with the control village averages.  
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Both show an average female education level in the household of less than primary 
school incomplete. Also the pre-programme 1991 village level female literacy rates 
are virtually identical among the programme and control villages with rates of 14.4% 
and 14.2% respectively (India Census Office, 2001a). 
 
An examination of village characteristics in Panel B shows a similar picture. Again 
the differences between programme and control villages are small and insignificant. 
Control villages are slightly more likely to have experienced a flood in the last three 
years. Differences regarding the occurrence of draughts, the quality of the roads, and 
availability of public transport are insignificant.  
 
The only notable exception is distance to the nearest town, which is considerably 
larger for control villages. The significantly larger average distance for control 
villages is probably a result of the programme block selection criteria. Both travel 
distance and distance to the nearest town increase if the villages in a block are more 
dispersed and remote. However, the larger distance to a town does not seem to affect 
the overall access to facilities that are generally considered to be relevant indicators of 
village level development. The percentage of villages with a market, post office, 
telephone, bus stop, bank or health center within their boundaries is about equal for 
programme and control villages. Likewise, in those cases where the facility is not 
available, we do not find any significant differences in the distance to the nearest 
facility outside the community. 
 
Finally, panel C of table 4 compares the presence of schools in programme versus 
control villages. With the exception of preschools, the percentage of villages with at 
least one primary, middle or secondary school available is roughly comparable 
between the two groups. As expected, preschools are more numerous in programme 
villages since the Mahila Samakhya groups have set up a considerable number of 
preschools. Note that the women's groups have started an equally large number of 
informal primary schools for girls. However, these do not make a difference in the 
primary school statistics since in most of those villages a formal primary school exists 
as well. 
     
Overall, the descriptive statistics show that the programme and control villages are 
highly comparable on a large number of population and village development 
characteristics. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that in the absence of the 
programme, child outcomes in the programme villages would have been similar to 
those in the control villages. The rest of the paper will assume that the control group 
represents a good counterfactual for the programme villages.  
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
 
In measuring the impact of Mahila Samakhya we focus on the effects of the 
programme on children of participants and non-participants in programme villages. In 
particular we will examine the effect of mother’s participation on child immunization 
and preschool/school enrolment, as well as the externalities on children of non-
participants. Girls and Scheduled Castes children will receive special attention in the 
remainder of the paper. First of all, they are the main target groups of the programme. 
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Second, these children are especially disadvantaged on a large number of issues, 
including education and health (Drèze and Sen, 2002).16 
 
4.1 Immunization 
 
We study the impact of the programme's activities on four vaccines against six types 
of preventable diseases: BCG (Bacille Calmette-Guérin vaccine against tuberculosis), 
polio, DTP (against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis or whooping cough) and 
measles.17 All four vaccinations are free, but they are distinct from each other in 
several respects. To eradicate polio, the national government has launched a large-
scale immunization campaign in 1995, the Pulse Polio Immunization Programme, to 
immunize all children under five against polio. At a few years intervals thousands of 
health workers are sent to all parts of the country to administer polio drops. Local 
community groups such as Mahila Samakhya groups are encouraged to participate in 
the organization of the campaign. Tuberculosis is the only vaccination that is not 
administered locally but at the block hospital. DTP and measles vaccinations have in 
common that they are both due in a relatively short period after birth. Both the DTP 
and the polio vaccine consist of several doses. Finally, immunization against measles 
suffers from the additional problem that it conflicts with a traditional belief. A 
goddess is believed to inflict measles on the family and child. Circumvention through 
immunization might anger her and cause even larger health problems. Especially in 
very traditional remote areas, this could hamper the increase of the measles 
immunization coverage rate. 
 
The programme offers health education through a variety of means. First of all, the 
programme directly disseminates information to the women’s groups through the 
weekly or monthly visits of the facilitator. The programme also organizes health 
trainings at the district level for the women's groups. To improve the quality of these 
health camps, Mahila Samakhya cooperates with health department functionaries such 
as Auxiliary Nurses and Midwives (ANMs), Lady Health Visitors and government 
doctors. In addition, the Mahila Samakhya programme in Sitamarhi and Muzaffarpur 
is engaged in a partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO) to train 
barefoot health workers. A representative of the women's group participates in the 
WHO training and disseminates the newly gained information about health and 
nutrition on her return in the village. The trainings increase health knowledge and 
                                                          
16 See Rao et al. (2003) for a socio-cultural analysis of gender and caste differences in primary 
education in India, Thorat (2002) for a discussion of current day discrimination of Scheduled Castes, 
and Hoff and Pandey (2004) for an experimental investigation of deeply ingrained beliefs among 
Scheduled Castes elementary school children. Kishor (1993) and Das Gupta (1987) study gender 
differences in child mortality and the underlying mechanisms that bring about these differentials. Pande 
(2003) analyses the gender inequalities in childhood nutrition and immunization in rural India. 
Whereas the differences in immunization between boys and girls are diminishing over time, the 
disadvantage in child health, child mortality and immunization coverage of Scheduled Castes children 
compared to other castes remains strongly present (International Institute for Population Sciences, 
2000). The World Bank (2001) and Filmer et al. (1998) provide overviews of gender inequality 
research, also covering India. 
17 In 1978 the Government of India initiated the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) with the 
objective of reducing morbidity, mortality and disabilities from these six diseases by making free 
vaccination services easily available to all eligible children. The objective of full immunization 
coverage is a cornerstone of the Indian child health care system (International Institute for Population 
Sciences, 2000). 
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give information on such practical issues as the weekly immunization days in local 
health centers and block hospitals for example.  
 
Apart from raising awareness among the participants, the trainings mobilize women to 
participate in the government Pulse Polio Campaign. Moreover, many women's 
groups initiate small immunization campaigns in their own village after having 
received a training. They go from door to door in their neighborhood to inform other 
families of the importance of immunization and about the free possibilities of 
immunization in the health centers.  
 
Figure 1 shows the 2003 immunization rates of children aged 0 to 13 in programme 
and control villages. Within programme villages it also compares households 
participating in Mahila 
Samakhya with non-
participating households. 
Since the control villages 
represent a good 
counterfactual, in the 
absence of externalities 
we would expect the 
immunization rates to be 
equal among non-
participants and control 
households. However, the descriptive statistics show a substantially higher 
immunization rate for non-participants. This difference is both sizeable and 
statistically significant (see panel A of table 5).  
 
Within programme villages, the difference between participants and non-participants 
is always positive but significant only for measles. On the one hand, this could 
indicate that the increased health knowledge spills over to a large extent to the rest of 
the community, thereby eliminating individual effects on participants. On the other 
hand, the participants usually belong to the least educated, poorest groups of a village 
and are thus expected to have a lower immunization rate. Indeed, the difference 
between the two groups becomes significant once we control for household 
characteristics. Panel B of table 5 indicates that overall, children belonging to the 
Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes are significantly less likely to be 
immunized against any of the four diseases (including polio) than General Castes 
children. Muslim children show an alarmingly low coverage rate compared to the 
total Hindu population, including the Scheduled Castes. Disaggregation by sex (panel 
C in table 5) does not show a significant difference between girls’ and boys’ 
immunization rates.  
 
The government polio campaign seems very successful in reaching a large number of 
children although one out of every ten children is not reached. There is no significant 
difference with respect to polio vaccination between the programme or control 
villages, indicating that the government campaign is equally active in all blocks under 
study. Participation of the women's groups might facilitate the campaign but does not 
have a visible effect on immunization coverage. Therefore, polio is left out of most of 
the following analysis. Overall, immunization against tuberculosis is more prevalent 
than against DTP and measles. Apparently, the longer vaccination period has a 
Figure 1. Immunization (children aged 0-13) 
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stronger positive effect than the potential downward effect of the longer travel 
distance. Immunization against measles is least common among participants, non-
participants and control households alike. 
 
4.2 Education 
 
Improving educational outcomes is one of the focus issues of the Mahila Samakhya 
programme in Bihar. The programme aims to raise awareness among its members 
with respect to the importance of education, for girls as well as for boys. The 
facilitators and programme trainers also discuss with participants the role of preschool 
education in preparing young children for school.18 Women's groups are stimulated 
and supported to set up informal preschools in their community (so-called bal jag jagi 
centers) as well as informal primary schools for girls who are not enrolled in formal 
school (jag jagi centers)19. 
 
The preschools aim to prepare young children aged 3 to 6 for entrance in primary 
school through games, stories and songs. By March 2002, the women's groups in 
Muzaffarpur had set up 137 preschools, in Sitamarhi they were operating 110 centers 
and in Darbhanga, the youngest programme district, 23 preschools had been opened 
(Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
 
For adolescent girls who have never been enrolled in primary school or have dropped 
out, the women's groups can open an informal girls’ primary school in their village. 
These primary schools operate a few hours per day during which the girls receive 
skills-based education with a focus on daily life issues. A second objective of the 
girls’ schools is mainstreaming. After passing three levels, a girl should be ready to 
enter the formal primary school system in the appropriate grade. In Muzaffarpur, 105 
informal schools had been opened by March 2002, 115 in Sitamarhi and 74 in 
Darbhanga (Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
 
Both the awareness raising activities and the opportunity to set up informal pre- and 
primary schools are likely to result in higher enrolment. Table 6 shows descriptive 
statistics about preschools in the study area. On average 24.6% of the control villages 
and 66.9% of the programme villages have at least one preschool in their 
community20. Accordingly, the overall preschool enrolment rate in control villages is 
7.7% compared to 22.2% in programme villages (53.4% among participants and 
                                                          
18 For overviews of the evidence on the impact of early childhood education programmes, see for 
example Barnett (1995), Young (1997; 2002), Karoly et al. (1998) or Currie (2001). Individual impact 
evaluations of preschool programs are for example Behrman et al. (2004) for Bolivia, Paes de Barros 
and Mendonca (1999) in Brazil, Kagitçibasi et al. (2001) in Turkey, and the evaluation of Head Start in 
the United States (Garces et al., 2002).  
19 Both the preschools and the girls' primary schools are opened only on demand of the women's group. 
The Mahila Samakhya programme provides initial and follow-up training for the instructor and 
finances her honorarium. However, the operation of the centers is the responsibility of the group. The 
women need to find a (covered) space for the center and to maintain the center. They choose the 
instructor (usually a woman from their own village) and monitor her. Also, the group is responsible for 
the payments to the instructor. 
20 Not all preschools are financed by Mahila Samakhya. A number of preschools are Early Childhood 
Education centers run by the Bihar Education Project. The ICDS (Integrated Child Development 
Services) scheme of the Ministry of Women and Child Development operates so-called Anganwadi 
centers. The data do not allow us to distinguish between these types of preschools. 
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20.4% among non-participants). Table 6 provides more details. Figure 2 gives us an 
impression of preschool enrolment by age. It represents the percentage of children 
aged 3 to 5 years old that go to preschool. For each age group, we see that Mahila 
Samakhya members 
send their children to 
preschool 
considerably more 
often than non-
participants from the 
programme villages. 
Also, non-participants 
from programme 
villages send their 
children significantly 
more often to 
preschool than parents from control villages. These differences are significant at the 
1% error level. Again, if there were no externalities of the programme we would 
expect to see an enrolment rate for non-participants similar to that of children in the 
control group. 
 
The higher preschool enrolment rate in programme villages might be related mainly to 
the increased availability of preschools in the community. If we consider only the 
villages with at least one preschool within the community boundaries the enrolment 
rates for control and program villages are 17.9% and 27.2% respectively (62.1% 
among participants and 25.1% among non-participants). Panel C of table 6 gives more 
details. 
 
The third child outcome we consider is enrolment in school of children 6 to 13 years 
old. These children can either be enrolled in primary or middle school. The enrolment 
rates do not take into account whether a child is enrolled in the appropriate grade. Nor 
do we look at actual attendance, since unfortunately these data are not available. 
Table 7 gives an overview of the net school enrolment rates. School enrolment in the 
study area is 75.5% in control villages compared to 80.2% in programme villages. 
Within programme villages we find an enrolment rate of 85.0% for children from 
participating households and 79.9% for non-participants. Whereas participants are 
more likely to be enrolled than both non-participants and control children, the 
differences are not statistically significant.  
 
Disaggregation of the data 
by gender shows an entirely 
different picture. Figure 3 
provides a graphical 
representation of the total 
enrolment and the enrolment 
rates of girls and boys 
separately. Without 
controlling for household 
characteristics, boys from 
participating households are 
significantly more likely to be enrolled than boys from non-participating households. 
Figure 3. School enrolment by gender
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Since members generally come from the poorest, least educated and socially 
marginalized groups, the descriptive statistics suggest a positive effect of the 
programme on the enrolment of boys whose mother participates. Differences between 
non-participating boys in programme villages and the control group are insignificant.  
 
However, the results for girls show a large and highly significant difference between 
programme and control villages. Both members and non-members in programme 
villages are substantially more likely to enroll their daughters in primary or middle 
school. These results suggest that the programme not only affects girls' enrolment of 
participants, but has significant spillover effects on non-participants' daughters as 
well. 
 
A similar pattern is revealed when comparing participants, non-participants and the 
control group by caste. Scheduled Castes households, whether participating in the 
programme themselves or not, shows a significantly higher enrolment compared to 
the control group. On the other hand for the Other Backward Castes we only find a 
significant increase in enrolment for participating households.  
 
To summarize, the descriptive statistics on education suggest that the programme 
increases both awareness and access to preschools in programme villages. 
Participating households are more likely to send their child to preschool than other 
families in the community. In addition, children in programme villages are more 
likely to be enrolled in preschool, regardless of whether their own mother is a member 
of Mahila Samakhya. These findings are strongly suggestive of the presence of 
externalities. Regarding school enrolment, the effects of the programme seem more 
subtle. Although the results in this section do not control for a number of household 
and other characteristics, the tables and graphs suggest that the programme influences 
school enrolment in the participating households for both boys and girls. Externalities 
on other households in the community appear to exist mainly for girls and Scheduled 
Castes children. 
 
 
5. Estimation methods 
 
The descriptive statistics in the previous section give a first indication of the impact of 
the programme. Overall, members of a Mahila Samakhya women's group perform 
better on both immunization and school indicators as compared to non-participants. 
Likewise, children of households that are not participating themselves but that are 
living in a programme village are more likely to be immunized and to go to preschool. 
The primary and middle education spillovers seem limited to girls and Scheduled 
Castes children. 
 
These results are merely indicative. First, participants usually belong to the more 
disadvantaged groups in their village in terms of caste, household education and 
income. Since these groups are also more likely to have low child outcomes, we will 
control for these household characteristics in order not to underestimate the impact of 
the programme. On the other hand, participation in the Mahila Samakhya programme 
is a voluntary decision. This could lead to a selection bias when comparing 
participants with non-participants. Participants might differ on additional 
unobservable characteristics such as awareness or motivation that could have a direct 
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effect on child outcomes beyond participation in the programme. That is, without the 
programme the immunization and enrolment rates of children of programme members 
might have been higher as well, due to unobserved characteristics.21 
 
We will estimate the probability of immunization and enrolment using the following 
econometric specification:  
 
(1) iiiiii PDPXaY ηφγβ ++++=  
 
where =iY  1 if child i is immunized / enrolled in (pre-) school; and 0 otherwise.  
 
iX  is a vector of explanatory variables containing child, household and community 
characteristics. The child characteristics refer to the sex and age of the child. It 
includes a dummy for prior preschool enrolment in the estimation of primary/middle 
school enrolment. The household characteristics include dummies for Scheduled and 
Other Backward Castes as well as for belonging to the Muslim population. Moreover, 
they include a measure for household income, for the highest education level of adults 
in the household and the highest female education level in the household. Household 
size, a child dependency ratio and the gender of the head of household are included as 
well. The community characteristics refer to the distance to the nearest town, a village 
development indicator based on road quality and the availability of facilities, the 1991 
(pre-programme) village level rate of female literacy and the 1991 village level 
percentage of Scheduled Castes population.22 The immunization estimations include 
the distance to the nearest health center. The 
preschool and school enrolment estimations 
include the number of pre- and primary schools 
respectively, and the latter also includes the 
average child wage in the village. Moreover, we 
include block and district dummies to control for 
variation in unobserved regional characteristics.23 
 
=iP 1 if child i is living in a programme village; 
and 0 otherwise. iD  = 1 if a female household 
member of child i participates in the programme 
(i.e. in a women’s group); and 0 otherwise. This 
specification allows us to estimate the effect of 
participation versus non-participation and of 
living in a programme village versus a control 
village. Figure 4 graphically shows these effects 
(not taking into account the remaining 
explanatory variables). The estimate for γ 
                                                          
21 For a review of non-experimental methods for the evaluation of social programmes and the 
estimation of treatment effects, see for example Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). 
22 We have also included the number of members and the years of existence of the women’s groups in 
estimations but these do not have a significant effect. Likewise, village population totals, higher order 
terms and interaction terms were included. These variables either have no significant effects or do not 
qualitatively change the results. Results are not shown here.  
23 In the school enrolment estimations, we use 1991 block variables on female literacy and 1991 % 
Scheduled Castes population instead of block dummies.  
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captures the effect of participating versus non-participating when living in a 
programme village. The estimate for φ  represents the difference between living in a 
programme village and living in a control village (regardless of whether the individual 
belongs to a participating household or not). In other words, φ  captures the spillover 
effects for non-participants. The sum of γ and φ  is the treatment effect for participants 
in the programme compared to the control group. 
 
To account for participation selection bias, we will use instruments for the decision to 
become a member. We use a two-stage instrumental variables approach with linear 
probability in both stages. The first stage reflects the participation decision and has 
the form: 
 
(2) iiii ZXcD μδλ +++=  
 
where Xi encompasses individual, household and community characteristics and Zi 
contains the instruments, not included in Xi. This equation is estimated only for the 
population living in programme villages.24 The estimated coefficients are used to 
predict participation for the entire population.25 The predicted participation variable, 
iDˆ , is entered as a new exogenous variable in the outcome equation and interacted 
with the programme village dummy: 
 
(3) iiiiii PDPXaY ηφγβ ++++= ˆ  
 
Since we assume that there is no village selection bias, the estimate for φ  captures the 
spillover effect, or –in case of village treatment heterogeneity– the spillover effect on 
the treated (i.e. on the programme villages). Although programme villages might have 
additional unobserved gains from being in the programme as compared to control 
villages, it does not seem likely that there is systematic village treatment 
heterogeneity after controlling for the block selection criteria and village variables. 
Appendix A gives a more detailed analysis of the treatment effects estimated when 
using the above specification. 
 
In the absence of participation treatment heterogeneity, the estimate for γ reflects the 
average treatment effect of participation. The sum of the estimates γˆ  and δˆ reflect the 
total treatment effect for participants compared to the control group.  
 
However, when there is participation treatment heterogeneity due to unobserved 
characteristics of participants, the instrumental variables estimate γˆ  of the average 
treatment effect on the treated is likely to be biased (Heckman, 1997).26 This will be 
                                                          
24 Appropriate weights in the participation equation correct for choice-based sampling of participants 
and non-participants in programme villages (Manski and Lerman, 1977).  
25 For more details on two-sample two-stage instrumental variables estimation, see Angrist and Krueger 
(1992). 
26 When using instrumental variables if treatment heterogeneity is present, the estimated treatment 
effect represents a local average treatment effect (LATE), or the effect of the programme on those 
individuals that change their decision to participate with a change in the instruments (Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996). Such an interpretation makes sense when the instrument denotes 
different policy regimes. However, in our case the instruments refer to personal attitudes and 
characteristics, and the interpretation of the LATE is not straightforward.  
 17
the case when individuals act on private information about their personal gains from 
the programme relative to others that cannot fully be predicted by observable 
variables. 
 
It is not clear whether participants in the Mahila Samakhya programme have 
additional unobserved relative gains from participation as compared to non-
participants. On the one hand, it seems likely that especially those women who expect 
to gain most will participate. On the other hand, some evidence suggests otherwise. 
When asked to list the benefits of participation, both participants and the non-
participants who know about Mahila Samakhya give a highly similar response.27 
Likewise, a reason for non-participants to expect less relative unobserved gains could 
stem from conflicts within the household because of participation. But again, the 
percentage of non-participants that would expect domestic conflicts from participation 
is not significantly different from the percentage of participants that actually 
experienced problems.28 Finally, it might be possible that women do not know 
beforehand what will be their personal gains from participation relative to others. 
Then the relative individual gains in child outcomes (due to unobservable 
characteristics) will not influence their participation decision in a systematic way. 
 
In sections 6.1 to 6.3 we will estimate the treatment effects using instrumental 
variables. In doing so we assume that participation treatment heterogeneity is 
negligible. In section 6.4, we will again estimate the treatment effects of the 
programme using propensity score matching instead. This allows for participation 
treatment heterogeneity, but it assumes on the contrary that participation selection 
bias on unobservables is negligible. 
 
6. Estimation of the treatment effects 
6.1 Identification of the instrumental variables 
 
To correct for the potential participation selection bias, we need instrumental 
variables that are correlated with participation in the programme but not correlated 
with the child outcomes. It is usually a difficult task to find these instruments. We 
propose a number of variables that are related to programme participation. To test 
whether they can be excluded from the outcome equations, we estimate the likelihood 
                                                          
27 We asked both participants and non-participants to name the most important benefits of participation 
in Mahila Samakhya. About 45% of the non-participants do not know enough about Mahila Samakhya 
to respond to these questions. The participants and the non-participants who know the programme 
mention the following benefits (as a percentage of all benefits they mention and in decreasing order). 
Increased literacy: 27% vs 29% (participants vs. non-participants), increased health knowledge: 23% 
vs. 25%, access to credit group: 18% vs. 20%, emotional support: 13% vs. 6%, improved education for 
children: 6% vs. 9%, empower as a woman within the community: 7% vs. 2%, access to government 
subsidies: 3% vs. 5%, improved status within the household: 2% vs. 3%, no benefits at all: 1% in both 
groups. Better access to water, improved infrastructure and ‘other benefits’ where mentioned in very 
few cases. The differences between participants and non-participants are highly insignificant except for 
the benefits derived from empowerment within the community and emotional support. (Results are 
weighted for the survey design and the standard errors are adjusted accordingly). 
28 Of the participants, 16% indicate conflicts with their husband or family-in-law because of less time 
for domestic chores due to participation and 19% indicate problems within the household because of 
organizing as a woman. For the non-participants that are familiar enough with the programme to 
answer the question, 17% and 22% can imagine to have these respective conflicts. The differences 
between participants and non-participants are insignificant. 
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of immunization and enrolment for control villages only. Apart from the child, 
household and community characteristics, these estimations contain the potential 
instruments. Since the programme is not active in these villages, we would expect to 
find a significant coefficient for the instruments if they are directly related to the child 
outcomes. If in contrast the coefficients of the instruments are small and statistically 
insignificant, this provides us with an argument to exclude the instrumental variables 
from the outcome equation. In that case, they will be used as instruments in the 
following sections. A test of overidentifying restrictions gives additional support to 
the exclusion restriction in those cases where two instrumental variables are retained. 
     
Two indicators are identified as potential instruments. The indicators are scores 
derived from a factor analysis of a number of statements. In particular, we consider a 
‘civicness’-indicator and an ‘assistance’-indicator. 29  
     
Table 8 describes the potential instruments (panel A), compares their means for 
participants, non-participants and control households (panel B) and shows the 
correlation matrix of participation and instruments (panel C). Although the 
instruments show sufficient variation and cover the same range for the three sample 
groups, their (weighted) mean varies among the three groups. On average participants 
in the Mahila Samakhya programme are more likely to have engaged in civic 
behavior during the last three years than non-participants. They also give more unpaid 
assistance to persons outside the household. Non-participants display on average 
slightly less civic behavior and give substantially less often assistance to others. Only 
the latter difference is statistically significant. The correlation matrix in panel C of 
table 8 uses only observations from programme villages. Especially ‘civicness’ is 
highly correlated with participation in Mahila Samakhya.  
 
The first condition to be satisfied is the nontrivial correlation with the participation 
variable. To further investigate this condition, table 9 shows the results of a probit 
estimation of the likelihood of participation in Mahila Samakhya. The observations 
are weighted for outcome-based sampling. Standard errors are robust and corrected 
for clustering at the village level. The control households are omitted from this 
estimation, since they do not have the opportunity to participate. Both potential 
instruments are significantly correlated with participation. These results are robust to 
changes in indicator calculations (using factor analysis, principal components or equal 
weights), and changes in the specification (including village and block dummies, 
block variables, additional trust and cooperation related variables, and higher order 
terms).  
 
The second requirement for the validity of instrumental variables is the exclusion 
restriction. Instruments should not directly influence the child outcomes, only 
indirectly through their relation with participation. This requirement is often 
                                                          
29 The two indicators are calculated using the loadings of the first rotated factor of a factor analysis.  
• The ‘civicness’-indicator is based on four types of civic behavior based on the answers to the 
questions: "In the last three years have you personally: a) Voted in the elections?, b) Contacted 
your elected representative about a community problem? c) Taken part in a protest march, 
demonstration or sit-in? and d) Actively participated in an information campaign?”.  
• The ‘assistance’-indicator is based on the answers to the following questions: “In the past year, has 
anyone in the household assisted someone else outside the household with: a) looking after 
children without getting paid; b) preparing food without getting paid; c) helping to build a house 
without getting paid; d) working without getting paid; or e) giving financial aid?”.  
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problematic as it is difficult, in general, to find such variables and to argue 
convincingly that the exclusion restriction is satisfied.  
 
Our sample design allows us to take a different approach. We will use the control 
group to test whether the potential instruments are partially correlated with the child 
outcomes. Since the programme is not active in these villages, any direct effect will 
be captured in a significant partial correlation of the instrumental variables with the 
outcomes. Table 10 gives the results of the probit estimations for each of the child 
outcomes under study. The usual child, household and community characteristics are 
included as explanatory variables.  
 
As the results show, both the ‘civicness’ and the ‘assistance’ indicators are not 
significantly related to any immunization outcome. A test of joint insignificance of 
potential instruments, given in the last row of the table, is not rejected. Changes in the 
specification (e.g. different calculation methods for the indicators, linear probability 
instead of probit, including and excluding village and block variables, introducing 
higher order and interaction terms) test the robustness of these results. Since the 
assistance-index is not robust for changes in the estimation of tuberculosis, it will not 
be used as an instrument for that type of immunization. Although ‘civicness’ is 
slightly significant for both preschool and school enrolment (but not at the 5% level), 
a test of joint insignificance of the two instruments is not rejected. Nonetheless, these 
estimations suggest that the instrumented results for education should be treated with 
some caution.  
 
The final instruments to be retained for each outcome are listed in table 11. The last 
row of the table gives the χ2-values of a test of overidentifying restrictions for those 
child outcomes with more than one potential instrument. A test of overidentifying 
restrictions does not reject the validity of the instruments at the 5% error level. We 
will retain ‘civicness’ and ‘assistance’ as an instrument for all outcomes, except for 
tuberculosis for which we will only use the former variable.  
 
 
6.2 Estimation of immunization 
Table 12 shows probit estimations of the likelihood of immunization for children aged 
0 to 13 years for the four types of vaccinations. Note that participation is not yet 
instrumented in these estimations. These first results clearly show the difference 
between polio on the one hand, and tuberculosis, DTP and measles on the other hand. 
Whereas the participation and the programme village dummy are highly significant 
for the latter three immunization probabilities, immunization against polio seems to be 
unrelated to the presence of Mahila Samakhya. Moreover, a number of household 
characteristics that are significantly correlated with the likelihood of immunization 
against tuberculosis, DTP and measles, such as household education, female 
education, household size and dependency ratio, are unrelated to the polio 
immunization rate. However, this is not surprising given the massive, nationwide 
nature of the polio campaign. An analysis of the mechanisms underlying polio 
immunization falls outside the scope of this paper. 
 
After the identification of the instrumental variables, we can estimate the effect of the 
programme on immunization using the two-stage instrumental variables approach 
described in section 5. Tables 13 to 15 give us the two-stage instrumental variables 
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(2S IV) estimations of the three immunization probabilities for the total child 
population and for several subgroups of children. As table 13 shows, the results for 
tuberculosis do not qualitatively differ when using a probit estimation (first column), 
a probit estimation with marginal probabilities30 (second column), linear probability 
without IV (third column) and the two-stage least squares estimation with IV (fourth 
column). In all four cases, the coefficients for participation and programme village are 
highly significant at the five or one percent error level. We correct the standard errors 
for clustering at the village level. Also, the standard errors for the two stage 
estimation are bootstrapped with two hundred replications. The coefficients are of 
similar magnitude except the 2S IV estimates that are considerably larger. This 
suggests that participants may indeed belong to the most uninformed and 
marginalized women, whom the programme intends to target.  
 
Since the effect of the programme for participants versus non-participants in 
programme villages is captured in the participation variable, the programme village 
dummy reflects the impact of living in a programme village versus control village 
regardless of whether the household itself is participating. In other words, the 
coefficient for the programme village dummy measures the spillover effects for non-
participating households. This same coefficient combined with the participation 
coefficient measures the effect for participants relative to the control group. 
 
The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign31 and are generally 
highly significant. In the first four specifications (columns (i) to (iv)) we find a strong 
negative coefficient for girls and for age. The latter indicates that the immunization 
coverage rate is increasing over time, with children who were born more recently also 
more likely to be immunized. The only difference between the instrumented and the 
non-instrumented specification is the negative coefficient for Scheduled Castes and 
Other Backward Castes, which is highly significant only in the instrumented version. 
Household education and income have a positive relation with immunization. The 
significant coefficient for female education indicates a strong and additional effect of 
the education of women. Larger households are less likely to immunize their child. 
This is also true for households with more children per adult. Distance to the nearest 
town and distance to the nearest health center are not significant for tuberculosis 
immunization. The estimations remain largely unchanged when we consider only girls 
or only boys, although girls’ immunization appears more dependent on the distance to 
the health facility. When we consider only Scheduled Castes children, the programme 
village variable becomes insignificant although it remains large and positive. Note 
that an interaction term between programme village and Scheduled Castes in the full 
sample is significant and positive, which would suggest increased impact on the 
lowest caste children.  
 
The results for the likelihood of immunization against DTP (table 14) and measles 
(table 15) are roughly the same. Again, we find a strong and positive impact for 
                                                          
30 The marginal probabilities in column (ii) of table 13 are based on calculations for the ‘average’ child. 
Since most of the variables used in the estimations are dummies, we also calculate the marginal effect 
of the programme based on the average of individual marginal effects. See table 18 for the results. 
31 For example, Partha and Bhattacharya (2002) estimate the probability of immunization in four Indian 
states including Bihar. They find odds ratios below one for girls, and for increasing birth orders, for 
Scheduled Castes children and Muslim children. Odds ratios above one were found for increasing 
levels of father’s education, and for mother’s education in addition to father’s education. 
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participation in the programme as well as for living in a programme village. An 
interesting difference with tuberculosis is the finding that the distance to the nearest 
health center becomes significant. Whereas tuberculosis is administered in block 
hospitals (and hence, distance to nearest town would be expected to play a role), DTP 
and measles vaccinations are given in the health centers. Indeed, children living 
further away from a health center are less likely to have received the vaccination 
against these two diseases. 
 
In summary, women who participate in a Mahila Samakhya women’s group are 
significantly more likely to immunize their child against tuberculosis, DTP, measles 
and polio than women who live in a programme village but who do not participate 
themselves. In addition, the highly significant coefficient for programme village 
indicates that non-participating women living in programme villages are also 
significantly more likely to immunize their child against tuberculosis, DTP and 
measles (but not polio) than women living in a village where the programme is not 
active. That is, the spillover effects on immunization coverage within programme 
villages is substantial. The only exception is immunization against polio.  
 
6.3 Estimation for educational outcomes 
 
Table 16 shows the results of several estimations for preschool enrolment of children 
aged 3 to 5 years. The first column shows the results of a simple linear probability 
estimation when we include all programme and control villages. As expected, the 
coefficient for the number of preschools within the village is highly significant.32 This 
coefficient reflects the importance of access in order to increase preschool enrolment. 
Simply put, if there is no preschool present in the village it becomes very difficult for 
parents to enroll their child. As for immunization coverage, we find large and 
significant effects both for participants versus non-participants, and for non-
participants versus the control group. Again, these findings suggest that the 
programme has substantial externalities for the wider community.  
 
In order to separate to some extent the effect of increased access from increased 
awareness, the remaining columns of table 16 show estimations of the likelihood of 
preschool enrolment only for those villages with at least one preschool. For the total 
population as well as for girls and boys separately the village dummy is very large 
and highly significant. Since access is not the main problem in these villages, it 
appears that the programme has been able to raise awareness about the importance of 
early childhood education33. Parents with equal possibilities send their children to 
preschool more often when they live in a Mahila Samakhya village compared to 
control villages, regardless of their own participation in the programme. The non-
instrumented and instrumented participation estimates are of equal size. 
 
Most of the child and household characteristics included in the estimations are not 
significant. A possible explanation for the absence of significant effects of these 
characteristics might be that the influence of the Mahila Samakhya programme is 
                                                          
32 Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. In the 2S IV estimation, 
standard errors are also bootstrapped with 200 replications.  
33 The introduction of village population size and an interaction term of village population size with the 
number of preschools in a village does not change the results. Population size and the interaction term 
are jointly and individually insignificant (with a negative coefficient for population size). 
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much stronger than the effect of other household characteristics. Hence, the usual 
household indicators might become insignificant. Children living in households with a 
higher child dependency ratio are more likely to be enrolled, suggesting that the need 
for child care is largest among households with more children per adult. Access plays 
an important role as well. Preschool enrolment is positively related to additional 
preschools in a community. Note that, conditional on there being at least one 
preschool, households in the least developed villages are most likely to enroll their 
child.  
 
Finally, we measure the impact of the programme on primary and middle school 
enrolment. Table 17 shows the results for enrolment in primary and middle school of 
children in the age group of 6 to 13 years. We find a highly significant positive effect 
of own participation in the programme, both in the instrumented and non-
instrumented estimations. The programme village dummy, which captures the 
spillover effects, is not significant for the total sample or for boys. It is significant and 
substantial for the subsample of girls and of Scheduled Castes children. However, 
these results hold only if we include an interaction term between programme village 
and 1991 pre-programme village female literacy levels.  Whereas these two variables 
individually are positive and significant, their interaction term is negative. This 
indicates that the programme indeed has spillover effects on non-participant girls (and 
SC children) in the community, but mainly in those villages where pre-programme 
female literacy rates were low. In higher educated villages, the programme 
externalities are smaller and statistically insignificant.  
 
Again, the estimates for the control variables do not change much between the 
different estimation methods. They all have the expected sign34 and significance35. 
Girls and Scheduled Castes children or Muslim children are less likely to be enrolled 
in school. Household education and income have a positive effect. Female education 
in the household has an additional positive and significant coefficient for girls’ 
enrolment only. Children living in larger households with more children are less 
likely to go to school. The positive coefficient for age signals late enrolment (age-
squared has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that this effect tops off). 
Finally, children that went to preschool at a younger age are more likely to be enrolled 
in primary / middle school. This could capture a higher awareness of parents 
regarding education. It could also stem in part from the stimulating effects of 
preschool on school preparedness and learning achievement.  
 
 
                                                          
34 Since primary education is not compulsory in Bihar, a household’s decision to send a child to school 
will depend both on the costs of education and on the perceived benefits. Costs relate for example to 
tuition fees (absent or very low in the study region), travel costs, costs of books and uniforms, and 
opportunity costs of foregone child labor. The benefits are longer term and concern not only future 
income but also a better ability of women to take care of their family for example [Glewwe, 2002 
#158]. To illustrate, a higher education of Indian mothers is found to be significantly related to reduced 
incidence of diarrhoea among children (Borooah, 2004; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003), to reduced fertility 
(Drèze and Murthi, 2001), and to school enrolment of their children (Behrman et al., 1999), especially 
their daughters [Pal, 2004 #140]. Whereas the costs to the family are immediate, the potential benefits 
of education are not always apparent. For girls in rural Bihar moreover, these benefits will usually not 
accrue to her own family. Upon marriage, women are mostly expected to move and live with their 
parents-in-law [Nabar, 1995 #153]. 
35 Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. In the 2S IV estimation, 
standard errors are also bootstrapped with 200 replications.  
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6.4 Propensity score matching 
 
To test our results further, we also use the propensity score matching (PSM) method 
to estimate the average treatment effects on the treated for participants versus non-
participants, and the spillover effects on non-participants versus the control group. 
This method is explicitly based on the assumption that, given the observable 
covariates, participation in the program is independent of the outcomes. That is, 
observable variables capture any systematic differences between participants and non-
participants. Other than those differences, there would be no systematic difference in 
the outcome if the program had not been implemented (i.e. we assume that 
)1,|()0,|( 00 === DXYEDXYE ).  
 
While the comparability of the treatment and control group increases with an 
increasing number of covariates, a larger number of controlling variables also 
significantly adds to the complexity of matching the two groups. However, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that whenever it is valid to match on all the 
covariates separately, it is also valid to match on the propensity score. The propensity 
score is the conditional probability of participation given a vector of observed 
covariates.  
 
We estimate the propensity score (the probability of participation in the programme) 
within programme villages only. The likelihood of participation is estimated with a 
probit model, using appropriate weights to correct for the choice-based sample 
selection procedure within programme villages. The covariates consist of the child, 
household and community variables as described in section 5 (except the instrumental 
variables).36 Using the coefficients from this estimation, the propensity scores were 
calculated for the participants, the non-participants and the control group. A 
regression of the participation dummy on the covariates and the propensity score 
provides a first test of the balancing requirement. Except for the coefficient of the 
propensity score, none of the coefficients are significant, either jointly or 
individually.37 
 
Matching occurred over the common support only, using nearest neighbor matching 
with replacement. To estimate the effects of participation versus non-participation 
when living in a programme village, participants are matched with non-participants. A 
test of the balancing requirement38 confirms that after matching, the differences 
between the sample means (as a percentage of the square root of the average sample 
variance) for each covariate in the two sub-groups are not significant.  
 
The total direct effect and the spillover effect are estimated by matching participants 
and non-participants respectively with children from comparable households in the 
                                                          
36 Instead of the calculated income quintile and village development index, both derived from factor 
analysis, we use the underlying individual variables for more detailed matching. 
37 Results available upon request. 
38 The balancing requirement is tested using the pstest-command in Stata suggested by Sianesi and 
Leuven (2001), http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html . This tests calculates the reduction in 
covariate imbalance after propensity score matching for each covariate. The imbalance or bias is the 
difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated sub-samples as a percentage of the square 
root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated group. 
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control group. Thus, we estimate the propensity score as the likelihood of 
participation also for the individuals in the control group, and use this estimate to 
match children in programme villages with similar children in control villages. Using 
20 as a cut-off point, some of the distance variables, especially distance to town, do 
not balance.39 However, their exclusion from the propensity score does not 
significantly change the results. The only exception is the estimated participation 
impact on boys’ school enrolment which is substantially smaller using the restricted 
specification, but still positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.40  
 
The results from PSM confirm the presence of both the direct impact and the spillover 
effect of the programme. Table 18 provides a comparison of the results from five 
alternative estimation methods. Consider first the results for immunization. The 
estimated treatment effects on ‘participants’ versus ‘non-participants’ when living in a 
programme village are given in columns (i), (ii) and (v). The participation effects are 
very similar among all methods and indicate a direct participation effect between 8 
and 10 percentage points. As discussed in the previous section, the instrumental 
variables estimates are substantially larger.  
 
The village dummy in columns (i) to (iii) captures the spillover effect of the 
programme on non-participants versus the total population in control villages. 
Column (iv) gives an estimate of the impact on the village as a whole. The estimates 
are of the same order of magnitude. The average spillover effect derived from PSM 
(column vi) is considerably lower than the estimates found with the other methods. 
However, the comparison group used in column (vi) is a different one: non-
participants are matched with control children with similar propensity scores instead 
of the entire control group. Since non-participants are relatively better off, their 
matched counterparts are also more likely to be immunized than the average for all 
children in control villages. The village effects remain very substantial at a 9 to 11 
percentage points’ increase in immunization coverage for non-participants. The 
results for polio consistently indicate the absence of treatment effects.  
 
The total direct impact of the programme on participants is captured by the sum of the 
participation and village effect in columns (i) to (iii). The PSM counterpart of this 
total impact is given in column (vi). The impact estimated from PSM (where 
participants are matched with control children showing comparable propensity scores) 
is considerably smaller. Since children of (would-be) participants are generally worse 
off than the average child is, we would expect the total impact estimated with PSM to 
be higher. The difference might be due to the different support. Other recent findings 
also suggest that PSM estimates do not precisely replicate experimental or regression 
results (Agodini and Dynarski, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2004).  
 
The second panel of table 18 provides a comparison between the various methods for 
preschool enrolment in villages with at least one preschool. Except for PSM, all 
methods estimate the effect on preschool enrolment of participation versus non-
participation at 21 percent and the village or spillover effect between 34 and 44 
percent. Based on the propensity score matching method (column vi) the total direct 
                                                          
39 For a few sub-samples the Muslim indicator or the dependency ratio does not balance either. 
40 The impact estimate using the restricted propensity score estimation is .066 with a standard error of 
.039. 
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effect on participants is lower but substantial at 34 percent and the total spillover 
effects on non-participants is 19 percent.  
 
The last panel of table 18 looks at the impact of the programme on school enrolment. 
Participation estimates for the total sample as well as for girls and boys separately 
indicate that participants are substantially more likely than non-participants and the 
control group to enroll their child. The total effect is estimated to be 11 percent using 
the PSM results. With spillover effects of at least 14 percentage points, externalities 
on girls living in programme villages are estimated to be almost as large as the direct 
effect. That is, once a Mahila Samakhya group is active in a village, girls’ school 
enrolment seems to increase regardless of whether her mother participates. Such 
externalities appear to be absent for boys.  
 
Using these results, it is possible to calculate the size of the spillover effect on non-
participants as a percentage of the total direct effect for participants. We use the 
treatment effects estimated with the propensity score method in column (vi). These 
are the most conservative estimates among the alternative methods. The estimated 
spillover effects show to be a very large percentage of the participation effects. In the 
case of immunization, the programme externalities on non-participants are at least 
forty percent of the direct programme effect on participants (excluding the 
insignificant estimates for polio): 54 percent for tuberculosis, 44 percent for DTP and 
40 percent for measles. Likewise, we find a spillover effect on preschool enrolment of 
non-participants that is equal to 54 percent of the size of the direct programme effects. 
Finally, programme spillovers on school enrolment of non-participants are 49 percent 
of the total impact on participants, but they are not significant for the sub-sample of 
boys.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The empowerment of low-caste low-educated women in India can have far-reaching 
consequences not only for the women themselves, but also for their children and for 
the wider community in which they live. An impact evaluation of the Mahila 
Samakhya programme in northern Bihar that specifically aims at those most 
marginalized women, shows that the mobilization of women into women’s 
community groups can generate large externalities.  
 
The programme has a significant impact on the children of women participating in the 
programme. The participants are considerably more likely to immunize their children, 
and to send them to preschool and school than are parents who do no participate in the 
programme. Moreover, we find significant spillover effects of the programme on 
households that live in villages where a women’s group is active, but that do not 
participate in the programme themselves. These externalities are especially strong for 
immunization against tuberculosis, DTP and measles (but not for polio), for 
enrolment in preschool, and for enrolment in school of girls (but not of boys). 
 
We find these treatment effects regardless of the method we use to estimate impact. 
Simple probit, linear probability, two stage instrumental variables, and propensity 
score matching yield results of comparable magnitude, although PSM estimates are 
generally lower on average. Nonetheless, the externalities remain significant and 
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large. They are equal to at least forty percent of the direct programme impact on 
participants’ immunization coverage, and half of the direct programme impact on 
preschool and school enrolment. 
 
These results show the importance of using the right comparison groups in 
programme evaluation to avoid a potentially double underestimation of the 
programme effects. Especially when an empowerment or community programme 
emphasizes awareness raising and information dissemination, combined with a focus 
on collective action, these externalities can be substantial. The design of the survey is 
crucial in measuring these effects. Moreover, the inclusion in the sample of a control 
group where the programme is not yet active allows for a direct test of the exclusion 
restriction needed to correct for participation selection bias. Especially programmes 
that are still at the beginning of a scaling-up process might offer great opportunities 
for quasi-experimental survey designs. 
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Appendix A. Estimation of treatment effects 
Let ii DPiY be the outcome Y for child i with 1=iP if the child lives in a programme 
village and 0=iP otherwise; and with 1=iD if a female household member of child i 
participates in the programme and 0=iD otherwise. We never observe 0=iP and 
1=iD at the same time. That is, people living in control villages cannot participate in 
the programme. To emphasize that the population in control villages does not have the 
opportunity to decide to participate in the programme, we will denote the outcome 
00
iY  as 0iY . 
 
The child outcomes for participants living in a programme village, for non-
participants living in a programme village, and for the control group living in control 
villages, 11iY , 01iY  and 0iY  respectively, are a function of observable characteristics Xi 
and unobservable characteristics Ui of the individual. The outcomes can be 
characterized as follows: 
  
111111 )( iii UXgY +=   if 1=iP and 1=iD  
(1a)  101010 )( iii UXgY +=   if 1=iP and 0=iD  
000 )( iii UXgY +=   if 0=iP  
 
We assume that the unobserved components are normally and identically distributed 
with mean zero. That is, we assume 0)|()|()|( 01011 === iiiiii XUEXUEXUE . 
 
We can observe either 11iY , 10iY  or 0iY  for an individual but never all three at the same 
time. The observed outcome Yi can be described with a switching regression model: 
 
(2)  01011 )1())1(( iiiiiiii YPYDYDPY −+−+=  
 
Substituting the outcome functions from equation (1a) in the switching regression 
model (2) yields: 
 
(3a)  iiiiiiiii PXgXgDPXgXgXgY ))()(())()(()( 01010110 −+−+=  
   00101011 )()( iiiiiiii UPUUDPUU +−+−+  
 
Using this model and omitting the i’s, we can define the treatment effects as: 
 
ATE  = )|( 1011 XYYE −    = )()( 1011 XgXg −    
ATET  = )1,1,|( 1011 ==− DPXYYE   = )1,1,|()()( 10111011 ==−+− DPXUUEXgXg   
 
SOE = )|( 010 XYYE −   = )()( 010 XgXg −  
SOET = )0,1,|( 010 ==− DPXYYE  = )0,1,|()()( 010010 ==−+− DPXUUEXgXg  
 
Total ATE  = )|( 011 XYYE −   = )()( 011 XgXg −    
 31
Total ATET  = )1,1,|( 011 ==− DPXYYE  =  
)1,1,|()()( 011011 ==−+− DPXUUEXgXg   
 
where ATE and ATET stand for Average Treatment Effect and Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated. SOE and SOET represent the Spillover Effect and the Spillover 
Effect on the Treated.  
 
To clarify the notation, we temporarily assume that –apart from treatment dummies, 
we have )()()()( 01011 iiii XgXgXgXg === . In practice, introducing interaction terms 
between the Xi ’s and the Pi - and Di -dummies will allow for different functions of the 
observable characteristics in the three different states. Similarly, we assume a linear 
functional form, to be modified introducing interaction terms and higher order terms 
of the Xi ’s. Then the outcome functions in (1a) become: 
 
1111 )( iii UXgY +++= φγ   if 1=iP and 1=iD  
(1b)  1010 )( iii UXgY ++= φ    if 1=iP and 0=iD  
00 )( iii UXgY +=    if 0=iP  
 
The switching regression model simplifies to: 
 
(3b) iiiii PDPXgY φγ ++= )( 00101011 )()( iiiiiiii UPUUDPUU +−+−+  
 
Based on the switching regression model in (3b), the econometric model to be 
estimated has the following form: 
 
(4) iiiiii PDPXgY ηφγ +++= )(  
 
where )( iXg captures the effect of observable characteristics on the outcome and the 
coefficients γ and φ capture shifts in the outcome due to respectively participation in 
the programme when living in a programme village, and to living in a programme 
village. In other words, since γ captures the total difference in outcomes between 
participants and non-participants in programme villages, φ represents the difference in 
outcomes between non-participants in programme villages and the population in 
control villages. The latter difference measures the spillover effect of the programme 
on non-participants. 
 
In terms of the econometric model, the treatment effects are denoted as: 
 
ATE   = )|( 1011 XYYE −   = γ  
ATET  = )1,1,|( 1011 ==− DPXYYE  = )1,1,|( 1011 ==−+ DPXUUEγ  
 
SOE   = )|( 010 XYYE −   = φ  
SOET   = )0,1,|( 010 ==− DPXYYE  = )0,1,|( 010 ==−+ DPXUUEφ  
 
Total ATE = )|( 011 XYYE −   = φγ +  
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Total ATET  = )1,1,|( 011 ==− DPXYYE  = )1,1,|( 011 ==−++ DPXUUEφγ  
 
 
Which parameters can be recovered under which assumptions?  
 
We observe the following three outcomes: 
)1,1,|()()1,1,|( 1111 ==+++=== DPXUEXgDPXYE φγ  
 )0,1,|()()0,1,|( 1010 ==++=== DPXUEXgDPXYE φ  
)0,|()()0,|( 00 =+== PXUEXgPXYE  
 
A naïve comparison of the three sample groups, yields the following estimates: 
 
1) A comparison of the observed outcomes for participants with non-participants in 
programme villages, i.e. )0,1,|()1,1,|( 1011 ==−== DPXYEDPXYE , yields the 
estimate γˆ . Using the outcome equations (1b) and adding and subtracting an 
additional term, this estimate can be decomposed as follows: 
 
γˆ  = )0,1,|()1,1,|( 1011 ==−==+ DPXUEDPXUEγ  
= )0,1,|()1,1,|()1,1,|( 10101011 ==−==+==−+ DPXUEDPXUEDPXUUEγ  
= ATE + participation treatment heterogeneity within programme villages + 
participation selection bias 
= ATET + participation selection bias 
 
If there is participation selection bias, we need to correct for it using instrumental 
variables. In that case and provided that there is no participation treatment 
heterogeneity, γˆ will measure the average treatment effect ATE.  
 
There are two cases for which participation treatment heterogeneity is zero 
(Heckman, 1997). First, when there are no unobservable components of the 
relative gains for participants. That is, conditional on the X-variables, the effect of 
the programme is the same for everyone: 
0)1,|()0,1,|()1,1,|( 101110111011 ==−===−===− PXUUEDPXUUEDPXUUE . 
The second case for which treatment heterogeneity equals zero, but with 
1011 UU ≠ given X, P and D, requires that the information on individual gains does 
not influence the participation decision of an individual (or that individuals do not 
act on this information). If people do not know what will be their individual gains, 
their best expectation might be the population gain, which equals 0. 
 
If on the other hand there is both participation selection bias and participation 
treatment heterogeneity for participants, the instrumental variables estimate γˆ  will 
be a biased estimate of the ATET (Heckman, 1997).41  It then represents a LATE or 
Local Average Treatment Effect (Angrist et al., 1996).  
                                                          
41 To see why instrumental variables will produce biased estimates in case of participation treatment 
heterogeneity, look at the simplified comparison of participants with non-participants (omitting the 
village dummy Pi ). The switching regression model of (3b) becomes: 
001 )()( iiiiiii UDUUDXgY +−++= γ .  
This can be reformulated (adding and subtracting additional components) as: 
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If participation selection bias is ignorable, the estimate represents the ATE, or the 
ATET in case of participation treatment heterogeneity. 
  
2) A comparison of the observed outcomes for non-participants in programme 
villages with the population in control villages, i.e. 
)0,|()0,1,|( 010 =−== PXYEDPXYE , yields the estimate φ) . This estimate can be 
decomposed as follows: 
 
φ)  = )0,|()0,1,|( 010 =−==+ PXUEDPXUEφ  
= )0,1,|( 010 ==−+ DPXUUEφ  
   )0,|()1,|()1,|()0,1,|( 0000 =−=+=−==+ PXUEPXUEPXUEDPXUE  
= SOE + village treatment heterogeneity for non-participants  
    + participation selection bias42 + village selection bias 
= SOET + participation selection bias + village selection bias 
 
Due to the nested structure of the sample, we not only consider participation 
selection bias and participation treatment heterogeneity at the individual level 
(which is the standard approach), but also selection bias and treatment 
heterogeneity at the village level.  
 
Given the discussion in section 3. we assume that village selection bias is 
negligible. In other words, we assume that there is no systematic difference in the 
effect of unobservable characteristics on child outcomes (after controlling for 
observables) between the population in programme and control villages if the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
0010101 )]1,|()[()]1,|([)( iiiiiii UDDXUUEUUDDXUUEXgY +=−−−+=−++= γ  
The comparison of participants with non-participants, )0,|()1,|( 01 =−= DXYEDXYE , yields 
γˆ = )0,|()1,|()1,|( 0001 =−=+=−+ DXUEDXUEDXUUEγ  
In case of selection bias, D is correlated with the unobserved 0U . Instrumenting for D can remove this 
bias. However, in case of treatment heterogeneity, i.e. when )()1,|( 0101 UUDXUUE −≠=− , and 
thus 0)]1,|([ 0101 ≠=−−− DXUUEUU , instrumenting for D will remove the correlation with 
0U but not the correlation with the rest of the unobservables. Since the vector Z of instrumental 
variables is correlated with D, it will also be correlated with part of the error term, namely with: 
)]1,|([ 0101 =−−− DXUUEUU . 
 
42 Participation selection bias in this case is measured as the difference between the unobserved 
components in the control state for participants versus the average programme village inhabitant. This 
amounts to the same as in comparison 1) where participation selection bias was represented as the 
difference between the unobserved components in the control state for participants versus non-
participants in programme villages. Note that:  
)]1,|0Pr(1)[1,1,|()1,|0Pr()0,1,|()1,|( 000 ==−==+====== PXDDPXUEPXDDPXUEPXUE  
We have participation selection bias if 0)1,|()0,1,|( 00 ≠=−== PXUEDPXUE . In other words, 
substituting for )1,|( 0 =PXUE , we have participation selection bias if 
)0,1,|( 0 == DPXUE )1,|0Pr(1[ ==− PXD )1,|0Pr(1)[1,1,|( 0 ==−==≠ PXDDPXUE , which 
means that )1,1,|( 0 == DPXUE 0)0,1,|( 0 ≠==− DPXUE .  
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programme had not been implemented at all. That is, 
0)0,|()1,|( 00 ==== PXUEPXUE . Using instrumental variables for the decision 
to participate will correct for potential participation selection bias.  
 
If there is no village treatment heterogeneity for non-participants, φ) will be an 
unbiased estimate of the SOE, the spillover effect of the programme on non-
participants. No village treatment heterogeneity implies that (a) the population in 
control villages would have benefited to the same extent as non-participants from 
unobserved gains from the programme if they had lived in a programme village, 
or (b) the programme villages are not selected on these unobserved gains for non-
participants relative to control villages.  
 
In the presence of village treatment heterogeneity, the instrumental variables 
estimate retrieves the SOET (the spillover effect on the treated), i.e. the effect of 
the programme on the non-participating population that actually lives in 
programme villages.  
 
3) The comparison of the observed outcomes for participants in programme villages 
with the population in control villages, )0,|()1,1,|( 011 =−== PXYEDPXYE , yields 
the sum of the estimates γˆ  and φˆ . 
 
φγ ˆˆ +  = )0,|()1,1,|( 011 =−==++ PXUEDPXUEφγ  
 = )1,1,|()1,1,|( 0101011 ==−+==−++ DPXUUEDPXUUEφγ  
    )]0,|()1,|([)]1,|()1,1,|([ 0000 =−=+=−==+ PXUEPXUEPXUEDPXUE 43 
 = Total ATE + participation treatment heterogeneity 
   + village treatment heterogeneity for participants  
   + participation selection bias + village selection bias 
= Total ATET + participation selection bias + village selection bias 
 
In section 3, we argue that village selection bias can be ignored. With instrumental 
variables and in the absence of participation and village treatment heterogeneity, 
we recover the total average treatment effect (total ATE). With instrumental 
                                                          
43 The decomposition in comparison 3. can be rewritten as the sum of the decompositions in 
comparisons 1. and 2. After omitting the common terms )1,1,|( 1011 ==− DPXUUE , 
)1,|( 0 =PXUE and )0,|( 0 =PXUE , the two versions (i.e. comparison 3. decomposition and the 
sum of the comparison 1. and 2. decompositions) are equal to each other if: 
)1,|()1,1,|()1,1,|( 00010 =−==+==− PXUEDPXUEDPXUUE = 
)1,|()0,1,|()0,1,|( 00010 =−==+==− PXUEDPXUEDPXUUE  
 )0,1,|()1,1,|( 1010 ==−==+ DPXUEDPXUE . 
Rearranging terms, the above equality states that village treatment heterogeneity for participants equals 
the village treatment heterogeneity for non-participants plus additional differences in programme and 
control outcomes for participants versus non-participants:  
)1,1,|( 010 ==− DPXUUE = 
+==− )0,1,|( 010 DPXUUE )}0,1,|()1,1,|({ 1010 ==−== DPXUEDPXUE
)}0,1,|()1,1,|({ 00 ==−==− DPXUEDPXUE  
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variables and village treatment heterogeneity but no participation treatment 
heterogeneity, we recover the total average treatment effect on the treated. If there 
is participation treatment heterogeneity as well as participation selection bias, the 
instrumental variables estimate can be interpreted as a local average treatment 
effect (LATE).  
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Table 1. Description of the dependent and independent variables  
Variables44 Description Nr. of 
obs.45 
Mean
46 
S.e.
47  
Min Max
       
Dependent variables       
Preschool  
(only children 3-5 years of age) 
Goes to preschool=1; otherwise=0 1025 .21 .034 0 1 
Primary/middle school  
(only children 6-13 years of age) 
Is currently enrolled in primary/middle 
school=1; otherwise=0 
2516 .80 .029 0 1 
       
Polio immunization  Immunized against polio=1; otherwise=0 4662 .88 .015 0 1 
Tuberculosis immunization  Immunized against tuberculosis=1; otherwise=0 4622 .67 .027 0 1 
DTP immunization Immunized against DTP=1; otherwise=0 4594 .64 .028 0 1 
Measles immunization Immunized against measles=1; otherwise=0 4591 .52 .049 0 1 
       
Child characteristics       
Sex  Female=1; male=0 4713 .47 .017 0 1 
Age  4758 6.53 .155 0 13 
Preschool  
(only children 6-13 years of age) 
Does/did go to preschool=1; otherwise=0 2631 .16 .028 0 1 
       
Household characteristics       
Scheduled Castes / Scheduled Tribes 
(SC/ST)
 48
 
Household belongs to SC/ST=1; otherwise=0 1991 .23 .030 0 1 
Other Backward Castes (OBC) Household belongs to OBC=1; otherwise=0 1991 .52 .026 0 1 
General Castes Household belongs to GC=1, otherwise=0 1991 .10 .020 0 1 
Muslim Household is Muslim=1; otherwise=0 1991 .12 .016 0 1 
Highest education in household Highest level for adult household members: 
No schooling=1 
Primary school incomplete=2 
Primary school complete=3 
Middle school complete=4 
High school complete or higher education=5 
1963 3.24 .197 1 5 
Highest female education in 
household 
See highest education in household, for female 
household members only 
1959 1.94 .108 1 5 
Income quintile Quintiles based on score from principal 
component analysis.49 First quintile for poorest 
and fifth quintile for richest households.  
1991 3.32 .143 1 5 
Female head of household Female head of household=1; male head of 
household=0 
1991 .05 .010 0 1 
Household size Number of household members 1991 6.86 .148 1 22 
Child dependency ratio Number of children aged 0-13 divided by 
household size 
1991 .66 .037 0 4 
Land ownership In acres  1949 3.75 .371 0 221 
       
Community characteristics       
Village development indicator Village development score based on principal 
component analysis50. An increasing score 
indicates higher village development. 
102 .66 .198 0 1 
                                                          
44 Child-related variables refer to all children in the age group of 0 to 13 years, unless mentioned 
otherwise. 
45 The total number of children aged 0 to 13 years in the sample is 4758. The total number of 
households in the sample is 1991, and the total number of villages is 102. The number of observations 
per variable may differ because of missing values or “don’t know” responses.  
46 The mean of 0-1 dummies can be interpreted as a percentage. 
47 Standard errors are corrected for the survey design. 
48 The percentage of the population belonging to the Scheduled Tribes is very small in Bihar. 
49 The income score is derived from a principal component analysis based on 18 household assets and 
facilities: quality of walls, roof, floor, home ownership, type of fuel, sanitation facilities, water 
facilities, garbage disposal, electricity, landownerhip, ownership of clock, cycle, radio, television, 
sewing machine, motor, fridge, car. The first factor, with an eigenvalue of 4.758, is retained. The 
poverty index, with mean zero, is calculated using the factor loadings of the first factor. Missing values 
were imputed. Based on the poverty index, quintiles were constructed where the first quintile 
represents the poorest 20% of the households. For a motivation of using a score to proxy Indian 
household wealth based on weightings for household assets, see Filmer and Pritchett (2001). 
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Table 2. Comparison of participants and non-participants in programme villages 
 
 Non-participants Participants P-value of the 
difference between 
participants and 
non-participants 
 
% SC/ST 22.37 38.99 0.005*** 
% OBC 53.43 49.15 0.419 
% General castes 10.50 2.25 0.002*** 
% Muslim 11.58 9.21 0.568 
    
Average income quintile 3.37 2.89 0.002*** 
Average area of land owned (acres) 0.38 0.18 0.000*** 
Highest level of education in 
household 
3.29 2.78 0.032** 
Highest female level of education in 
household 
1.98 1.59 0.003*** 
    
Household size 6.89 6.51 0.083* 
Child dependency ratio 0.66 0.84 0.001*** 
Number of children <= 13 years of 
age 
2.39 2.60 0.074* 
% with female head of household 5.09 5.68 0.703 
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors  corrected 
accordingly. 
• For a description of the variables, see table 1. 
• *: p-value < 0.10; **: p-value < 0.05; ***: p-value < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Mahila Samakhya programme data by district 
 
 Darbhanga Muzaffarpur Sitamarhi 
Total nr. of blocks in district 18 16 17* 
Total nr. of blocks where the MS 
programme is active 
2 5 13 
Total nr. of villages in MS blocks 1269 1833 846 
Total nr. of villages where the MS 
programme is active 
250 409 300 
% of villages covered 19.7% 22.3% 35.5% 
Nr. of active groups** 190 374 345*** 
Source: Mahila Samakhya District Project Offices (Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Sitamarhi), March 2003. 
 
* After a recent administrative bifurcation of Sitamarhi in two districts, Sitamarhi currently has 8 
blocks. Only these 8 blocks are incorporated in the sample. 
** Not including emerging groups. Source: Mahila Samakhya (2002), data as of March 2002. 
*** In some villages more than one group is active.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
50 The village development indicator is derived from a principal component analysis of the quality of 
the roads within the village, the availability within the village boundaries of a market, post office, 
telephone, bus, and bank, and the quality of the roads. The first factor, with an eigenvalue of  2.930, is 
retained and its factor loadings are used to calculate the village development indicator, imputing 
missing values. The score is rescaled to a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. 
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Table 4. Comparison of programme and control villages 
 
 Control villages Programme villages P-value of the 
difference 
PANEL A    
    
Population characteristics    
% Scheduled Castes / Scheduled Tribes 23.44 23.27 0.980 
% Other Backward Castes 45.61 53.20 0.210 
% General Castes 13.78 10.05 0.426 
% Muslim 18.72 11.45 0.216 
    
Average income quintile 3.13 3.34 0.266 
Average land ownership (in acres) 0.35 0.37  0.786 
Highest education level in household 3.07 3.26 0.473 
Highest female education level in household 1.80 1.96 0.339 
Average household size 6.74 6.87 0.606 
Average child dependency ratio 0.60 0.67 0.191 
Number of children <=13 years old 2.21 2.40 0.158 
% households with female head 5.70 5.13 0.683 
    
PANEL B    
    
Village characteristics    
% with flood in last three years 90.86 78.05 0.066* 
% with draught in last three years 46.45 45.80 0.944 
Average road quality 1.53 1.54 0.972 
Availability of public transport 48.77 56.40 0.531 
Average child wage (rupees) 29.01 25.03 0.152 
Average distance to nearest town (km) 24.81 12.80 0.000*** 
    
% of villages with facility available    
Market 44.24 40.50 0.743 
Post office 45.51 25.62 0.071* 
Telephone 71.14 62.21 0.299 
Bus stop 27.22 31.20 0.723 
Bank 17.82 12.72 0.582 
Health center 36.38 41.62 0.659 
    
Distance from community if not available (km)   
Market 2.07 2.63 0.133 
Post office 2.10 2.20 0.717 
Telephone 4.57 2.85 0.313 
Bus stop 2.66 2.89 0.681 
Bank 3.24 3.43 0.703 
Health center 3.30 2.94 0.516 
    
PANEL C    
    
Average number of villages that have at least one school of 
the type specified: 
  
Preschool 24.64 66.88 0.000*** 
Primary school 88.06 85.50 0.760 
Middle school 24.26 23.01 0.905 
High school 3.34 6.44 0.526 
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
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Table 5. Immunization rates (children aged 0 to 13 years) 
 
PANEL A.  Comparison of control villages and programme villages 
 
  Programme village P-values of the difference 
between: 
 Control 
village 
Programme 
village 
Members 
only 
Non-
members 
only 
Control and 
programme 
village 
Members and 
non-members 
       
Tuberculosis 44.34 68.97 74.03 68.66 0.0001*** 0.165 
Polio 88.89 88.40 88.92 88.36 0.8380 0.811 
DTP 41.73 65.72 70.58 65.41 0.0000*** 0.174 
Measles 36.24 53.94 64.50 53.26 0.0125** 0.028** 
       
       
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
 
PANEL B. Immunization by caste 
 
 Scheduled Castes Other Backward 
Castes 
General Castes Muslim 
Tuberculosis 63.92 66.13 87.97*** 45.14*** 
Polio 86.16 86.90 94.59** 91.41 
DTP 64.83 60.95 87.98*** 43.58*** 
Measles 57.54 51.26 77.38*** 35.76*** 
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• P-values are calculated for the difference in means between a subpopulation (e.g. Scheduled 
Castes) and the rest of the child population. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01  
 
 
PANEL C. Immunization by gender 
 
 Total Members Non-members Control 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
         
Tuberculosis 66.06 67.58 75.56 72.07 67.60 69.67 45.74 42.98 
Polio 89.09 87.95 90.12 87.61 88.84 88.12 90.77 86.47** 
DTP 63.24 63.89 72.20 68.47 64.73 65.94 43.97 39.83 
Measles 52.07 52.58 66.74 61.75 52.71 53.67 37.63 35.25 
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• P-values are calculated for the difference in means between boys and girls in a subpopulation (e.g. 
members only). *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01  
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Table 6. Preschool enrolment (children aged 3 to 5 years) 
 
  Programme village P-values of the 
difference between: 
 Control 
village 
Programme 
village 
Members 
only 
Non-
members 
only 
Control and 
programme 
village 
Members 
and non-
members 
PANEL A. Availability of preschools 
       
Average # of 
preschools in 
village 
0.35 0.88   .004***  
% of villages with 
at least one 
preschool 
24.64 66.88   .000***  
       
PANEL B. % preschool enrolment of children 3 to 5 years old  
       
% of all children 7.73 22.21 53.40 20.36 .008*** .000*** 
       
% of boys 8.54 18.83 51.85 17.32 .065* .000*** 
% of girls 6.87 26.08 54.75 24.04 .007*** .000* 
       
% of SC/ST 0.00 23.98 48.37 21.07 .000*** .010** 
% of OBC 13.67 24.18 58.28 22.52 .180 .000*** 
% of General Caste 9.76 17.00 25.53 16.93 .556 .724 
% of Muslims 0.00 20.69 60.00 18.16 -- .078* 
       
% of 3 years old 6.16 18.74 44.47 17.15 .023** .000*** 
% of 4 years old 5.12 21.02 61.33 18.17 .012** .000*** 
% of 5 years old 11.16 26.18 54.08 24.83 .055* .000*** 
       
       
PANEL C. % preschool enrolment ONLY in villages with AT LEAST ONE PRESCHOOL 
       
% of all children 17.86 27.16 62.15 25.11 .386 .000*** 
       
% of boys 21.57 22.87 60.35 21.14 .909 .000*** 
% of girls 12.57 32.42 63.24 30.14 .124 .000*** 
       
% of SC/ST 0.00 24.62 53.59 21.13 .001*** .014** 
% of OBC 27.79 28.98 75.76 27.27 .926 .000*** 
% of General Caste 100.00 17.92 25.53 17.83 .000*** .762 
% of Muslims 0.00 63.72 65.59 33.40 -- .260 
       
% of 3 years old 14.42 25.18 52.98 23.40 .275 .001*** 
% of 4 years old 10.96 23.98 69.13 20.80 .250 .000*** 
% of 5 years old 24.98 31.38 62.75 29.95 .671 .001*** 
 
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
• The difference between boys and girls is never significant (for none of the subgroups: participants, 
non-participants, control). This holds both for panel B. and panel C. of the table. 
• The difference between the castes is never significant for participants or non-participants.  Among 
the control group children however, General Caste children are most likely to go to preschool and 
SC/ST and Muslim children are least likely to go to preschool. But note that for the control group 
in panel C. the 0 % for SC/ST refers to only 26 children. The 100 % for General Castes and the 
0% for Muslim children refer both to a single child. 
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Table 7. School enrolment (children aged 6 to 13 years) 
 
 
 
  Programme village P-values of the difference 
between: 
 Control 
village 
Programme 
village 
Members 
only 
Non-
members 
only 
Control and 
programme 
village 
Members and 
non-members 
       
All children 75.54 80.19 84.95 79.87 .307 .160 
       
Boys 82.85 80.13 87.63 79.61 .568 .035** 
Girls 66.32 80.76 81.77 80.70 .020** .821 
       
SC/ST 55.03 76.79 77.01 76.77 .003*** .971 
OBC 82.06 77.85 89.52 77.08 .522 .021** 
General  90.18 98.35 88.62 98.47 .129 .082* 
Muslim 73.90 80.38 93.71 79.95 .473 .132 
       
 
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01  
• The difference in school enrolment between boys and girls is highly significant in control villages 
but not in programme villages. However, participants are less likely to send their daughters to 
school than non-participants (without correcting for household characteristics). 
• Scheduled Castes children are significantly less likely to be enrolled in control villages, but not in 
programme villages. General Castes children are significantly more likely to be enrolled than other 
children, in both sample groups.  
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Table 8. Instrumental variables 
 
 
Panel A. Description of the instrumental variables (non-weighted) 
 
 Obs. Mean St. dev. Min  Max 
      
Civicness 
Total population 1975 .000 .735 -0.618 1.707 
Participants 714 .521 .802 -0.618 1.707 
Non-participants 710 -.280 .479 -0.618 1.707 
Control 551 -.314 .510 -0.618 1.707 
      
Giving assistance 
Total population 1986 .000 .816 -2.258 0.388 
Participants 716 .163 .620 -2.258 0.388 
Non-participants 714 -.135 .922 -2.254 0.388 
Control 556 -.036 .858 -2.254 0.388 
      
 
 
Panel B. Comparison of the sample groups (weighted observations) 
 
  Programme villages P-values of the difference 
between: 
 Control 
villages 
Programme 
villages 
Members 
only 
Non-
members 
only 
Control and 
programme 
village 
Members 
and non-
members 
       
Civicness -0.28 -0.25 0.77 -0.31 .687 .000*** 
Giving assistance -0.06 -0.33 0.18 -0.36 .003*** .000*** 
       
• Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly.  
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
 
 
Panel C. Correlation matrix of participation and instruments (programme villages only) 
 
 Participation in MS Civicness Giving 
assistance 
Participation in MS 1.000   
Civicness 0.523 1.000  
Giving assistance 0.187 0.144 1.000 
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Table 9. Testing the correlation of participation with instrumental variables (probit) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Participation in Mahila Samakhya 
(only for programme villages) 
 Coefficient s.e. 
Instrumental variables   
Civicness .918 .114*** 
Assistance .274 .061*** 
   
Individual characteristics   
Age -.009 .004** 
   
Household characteristics   
SC / ST .862 .297*** 
Other Backward Castes .842 .253*** 
Muslim .560 .302* 
Household education .021 .030 
Female education .001 .036 
Income quintile -.034 .030 
Female household head .217 .132 
Household size -.029 .015* 
Dependency ratio .129 .060** 
   
Community 
characteristics 
  
Distance to town .003 .009 
Village development score -.155 .270 
1991 village literacy rate -.004 .005 
Block dummies   
District dummies   
   
# obs 1391  
F-test (instrumental 
variables) χ
2(2)=69.35 p=0.000*** 
 
• Observations are weighted for the outcome-based sampling procedure. 
• Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level.  
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
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Table 10. Testing the instrumental variables in control villages (probit) 
 
 Tuberculosis DTP Measles Preschool (only 
villages with >=1 
preschool) 
School  
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Instrumental variables           
Civicness .198 .180 .102 .150 .195 .137 -8.307 4.658* .240 .137* 
Assistance -.021 .103 -.087 .106 -.127 .110 -1.074 .914 .082 .063 
           
Child characteristics           
Sex  -.118 .096 -.142 .100 -.086 .100 2.147 1.619 -.547 .142*** 
Age -.058 .016*** -.057 .015*** -.041 .016*** 1.061 .690 .270 .025*** 
Prior enrolment in 
preschool 
        .369 .288 
           
Household characteristics          
SC/ST -.339 .391 -.540 .379 -.693 .366*   -.247 .319 
OBC .142 .352 -.050 .354 .027 .305   .082 .210 
Muslim -.436 .403 -.338 .432 -.475 .388   -.135 .262 
Household education .086 .058 .065 .054 .107 .051** 6.553 4.195 .088 .058 
Female education .087 .077 .088 .079 .117 .077* -3.233 2.124 .072 .046 
Income quintile .152 .054*** .173 .062*** .097 .068 .817 .563 .150 .054*** 
Female household head -.045 .234 .001 .227 -.384 .281 …  .109 .351 
Household size -.045 .030 -.054 .035 -.040 .036 -.244 .199 .005 .025 
Dependency ratio -.190 .099* -.286 .099*** -.103 .077 12.883 7.960 .099 .105 
           
Community characteristics          
Distance to health center -.045 .074 -.015 .079 -.112 .083     
Village/block/district variables          
           
Observations 1102  1097  1099  52  848  
Test of joint significance 
of instrumental variables 
χ2(2)= 
1.37 p=0.504 
χ2(2)= 
1.31 p=0.518 
χ2(2)= 
3.67 
p=.160 χ2(2)= 
3.21 
p=0.201 χ2(2)= 
4.15 
p=.126 
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level.
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Table 11. Summary of instrumental variables 
 
 Tuberculosis DTP Measles Preschool School 
      
Civicness X X X X X 
      
Assistance  X X X X 
      
      
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions (using 
2SIV) if more than one 
instrument 
 χ2(1) = 1.340 
  
p=0.247 
χ2(1) = .785 
 
P=0.367 
χ2(1) = .284 
 
P=.594 
χ2(1) = 3.229 
 
P=.072 
 
      
 Where X means that the row- variable will be used as instrument for the estimation of the particular 
child outcome. 
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Table 12. Probit estimation of immunization (without instrumental variables) 
 
Dependent variable: Tuberculosis DTP Measles Polio 
 Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
         
Programme variables 
Participation variable .258 .091*** .304 .088*** .290 .086*** .015 .095 
Programme village .627 .279** .547 .216** .922 .266*** -.014 .202 
         
Child characteristics 
Sex  -.154 .043*** -.158 .042*** -.142 .040*** -.171 .057*** 
Age -.050 .008*** -.042 .008*** -.024 .008*** -.181 .014*** 
         
Household characteristics 
SC/ST -.248 .199 -.464 .191** -.291 .184 -.275 .175 
OBC -.170 .187 -.320 .180* -.127 .160 -.288 .175 
Muslim -.585 .198*** -.592 .198*** -.469 .182** -.391 .170** 
Household education .066 .024*** .065 .025*** .086 .026*** -.020 .027 
Female education .152 .034*** .157 .038*** .131 .033*** .045 .035 
Income quintile .096 .029*** .089 .031*** .076 .031** .119 .032*** 
Female household 
head 
-.165 .140 -.143 .141 -.120 .145 -.361 .158** 
Household size -.044 .013*** -.040 .014*** -.032 .014** -.006 .015 
Dependency ratio -.135 .050*** -.166 .056*** -.057 .051 -.010 .058 
         
Community characteristics 
Distance to town .001 .006 .003 .006 .003 .006 .013 .005** 
Distance to health 
center 
-.021 .022 -.036 .022 -.033 .022 -.011 .021 
Village development  -.092 .279 .031 .274 .246 .301 .257 .216 
1991 village literacy  .002 .006 .002 .005 -.006 .006 .007 .005 
Sitamarhi district .471 .192** .540 .203*** .217 .186 .758 .122*** 
Darbhanga district -.738 .412* -1.032 .383*** -.784 .468* .136 .167 
Block dummies         
         
# obs 4517  4489  4486  4556  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. 
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Table 13. Tuberculosis with different estimation methods 
Dependent variable: 
Tuberculosis 
Probit (no IV) 
(1) 
Probit (no IV; 
marginal prob.)   (2) 
Lin prob (no IV) 
(3) 
2S IV  
(4) 
2S IV – GIRLS only 
(5) 
2S IV – BOYS only 
(6) 
2S IV – Scheduled 
Castes (7) 
 Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
Programme variables               
Programme member .258 .091*** .099 .034*** .084 .027*** .205 .027*** .232 .044*** .189 .034*** .118 .060* 
Programme village .627 .279** .245 .107** .204 .083** .149 .049*** .112 .072** .184 .069*** .359 .278 
              
Child characteristics              
Sex  -.154 .043*** -.060 .017*** -.046 .013*** -.052 .012***     -.057 .022** 
Age -.050 .008*** -.020 .003*** -.015 .002*** -.015 .002*** -.013 .002*** -.017 .003*** -.013 .003*** 
              
Household char.              
SC/ST -.248 .199 -.097 .078 -.071 .055 -.094 .027*** -.101 .041** -.093 .035**   
OBC -.170 .187 -.066 .072 -.042 .050 -.058 .025** -.064 .039 -.054 .032*   
Muslim -.585 .198*** -.230 .076*** -.181 .058*** -.176 .027*** -.174 .044*** -.182 .036***   
Household education .066 .024*** .026 .009*** .022 .008*** .021 .005*** .017 .008** .023 .007*** -.007 .009 
Female education .152 .034*** .059 .013*** .040 .009*** .042 .005*** .048 .007*** .035 .008*** .048 .013*** 
Income quintile .096 .029*** .037 .011*** .030 .009*** .033 .006*** .041 .008*** .025 .008*** .027 .011** 
Female hh head -.165 .140 -.065 .056 -.043 .044 -.046 .032 -.042 .045 -.049 .046 -.269 .067*** 
Household size -.044 .013*** -.017 .005*** -.013 .004*** -.010 .003*** -.006 .004 -.015 .004*** .009 .006 
Dependency ratio -.135 .050*** -.052 .019*** -.039 .016** -.044 .010*** -.041 .015*** -.049 .014** -.079 .019*** 
              
Community char.              
Distance to town .001 .006 .000 .002 -.000 .002 -.000 .001 -.003 .001** .002 .002 .003 .002 
Distance health center -.021 .022 -.008 .008 -.006 .006 -.005 .004 -.003 .005 -.007 .005 -.043 .010*** 
Village development  -.092 .279 -.036 .109 -.021 .087 -.039 .046 .132 .071* .047 .059 -.285 .090*** 
1991 village literacy  .002 .006 .001 .002 .001 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 -.003 .001*** 
Sitamarhi district .471 .192** .179 .071** .146 .061** .137 .085 .142 .127 .074 .155 .183 .256 
Darbhanga district -.738 .412* -.286 .155* -.240 .125* -.466 .129** -.251 .190 -.476 .149*** -.166 .335 
Block dummies              
              
# obs 4517  4517  4517  4469  2117  2352  1256  
R-squared    .271  .260  .285  .241  .296  
 *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2S IV estimations. 
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Table 14. DTP with different estimation methods 
Dependent variable: 
DTP 
Probit (no IV) 
(1) 
Lin prob (no IV) 
(3) 
2S IV  
(4) 
2S IV – GIRLS only 
(5) 
2S IV – BOYS only 
(6) 
2S IV – Scheduled Castes  
(7) 
 Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
Programme variables             
Participation .304 .088*** .097 .026*** .209 .028*** .252 .044*** .176 .034*** .135 .058** 
Programme village .547 .216** .172 .067** .122 .050** .105 .073** .135 .070* -.108 .352 
            
Child characteristics             
Sex  -.158 .042*** -.047 .012*** -.052 .012***     -.036 .023 
Age -.042 .008*** -.013 .002*** -.012 .002*** -.011 .003*** -.014 .003*** -.012 .003*** 
            
Household char.             
SC/ST -.464 .191** -.125 .051** -.146 .028*** -.146 .043*** -.155 .035***   
OBC -.320 .180* -.077 .047 -.093 .025*** -.103 .040** -.085 .032**   
Muslim -.592 .198*** -.170 .056*** -.166 .028*** -.170 .044*** -.169 .037***   
Household education .065 .025*** .022 .008*** .020 .005*** .017 .008** .022 .007*** -.002 .009 
Female education .157 .038*** .045 .011*** .047 .006*** .059 .008*** .035 .008*** .023 .016 
Income quintile .089 .031*** .026 .009*** .029 .006*** .029 .008*** .028 .008*** .049 .011*** 
Female hh head -.143 .141 -.040 .043 -.043 .031 -.049 .041 -.038 .045 -.226 .069*** 
Household size -.040 .014*** -.011 .004*** -.009 .003*** -.003 .004 -.015 .004*** .004 .005 
Dependency ratio -.166 .056*** -.045 .016*** -.052 .009*** -.038 .014*** -.068 .014*** -.072 .017*** 
            
Community char.             
Distance to town .003 .006 .001 .002 .000 .001 -.002 .002 .003 .002* .008 .002** 
Distance health center -.036 .022 -.010 .007 -.010 .004*** -.014 .005** -.006 .005 -.046 .010*** 
Village development  .031 .274 .020 .085 .001 .043 -.097 .067 .081 .058 -.158 .088* 
1991 village literacy  .002 .005 .001 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 -.004 .001*** 
Sitamarhi district .540 .203*** .136 .066** .158 .096* .321 .152** .097 .161 -.492 .414 
Darbhanga district -1.032 .383*** -.517 .073*** -.311 .106*** -.305 .179* -.310 .123*** -.458 .312 
Block dummies            
            
# obs 4489  4489  4435  2102  2333  1238  
R-squared   .294  .283  .291  .281  .335  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2S IV estimations. 
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Table 15. Measles with different estimation methods 
Dependent variable: 
Measles 
Probit (no IV) 
(1) 
Lin prob (no IV) 
(3) 
2S IV  
(4) 
2S IV – GIRLS only 
(5) 
2S IV – BOYS only 
(6) 
2S IV – Scheduled Castes  
(7) 
 Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
Programme variables             
Participation .290 .086*** .092 .027*** .185 .027*** .199 .046*** .170 .039*** .031 .058 
Programme village .922 .266*** .309 .084*** .268 .050*** .273 .068*** .267 .070*** .157 .339 
            
Child characteristics             
Sex  -.142 .040*** -.043 .012*** -.045 .013***     -.019 .024 
Age -.024 .008*** -.008 .002*** -.007 .002*** -.009 .002*** -.006 .003** -.007 .003** 
            
Household char.             
SC/ST -.291 .184 -.086 .054 -.106 .028*** -.072 .044 -.141 .036***   
OBC -.127 .160 -.034 .047 -.046 .026* -.016 .042 -.069 .032**   
Muslim -.469 .182** -.141 .054** -.136 .030*** -.120 .045** .156 .039***   
Household education .086 .026*** .027 .008*** .026 .005*** .030 .008*** .023 .007*** .004 .008 
Female education .131 .033*** .043 .010*** .045 .006*** .054 .009*** .036 .009*** .022 .017 
Income quintile .076 .031** .024 .009** .025 .006*** .016 .008** .031 .008*** .027 .010** 
Female hh head -.120 .145 -.035 .044 -.037 .029 -.012 .037 -.050 .044 -.233 .057*** 
Household size -.032 .014** -.009 .004** -.008 .003*** -.003 .004 -.012 .003*** .011 .005** 
Dependency ratio -.057 .051 -.013 .015 -.019 .009** -.006 .014 -.030 .014* -.024 .017 
            
Community char.             
Distance to town .003 .006 .001 .002 .000 .001 -.001 .001 .002 .002 .005 .002** 
Distance health center -.033 .022 -.010 .007 -.009 .004** -.010 .005** -.007 .005 -.046 .010*** 
Village development  .246 .301 .073 .092 .044 .048 .012 .067 .086 .061 -.113 .087 
1991 village literacy  -.006 .006 -.001 .002 -.001 .001 -.001 .001 -.002 .001** -.004 .001*** 
Sitamarhi district .217 .186 .072 .059 .174 .085** .055 .162 .065 .127 -.312 .426 
Darbhanga district -.784 .468* -.534 .068*** -.198 .146  -.194 .230 -.208 .144 -.360 .294 
Block dummies            
# obs 4486  4486  4432  2100  2332  1239  
R-squared   .291  .283  .275  .270  .361  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2S IV estimations.
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 Table 16 Preschool enrolment with different estimation methods 
 ALL VILLAGES ONLY VILLAGES WITH AT LEAST ONE PRESCHOOL 
Dependent variable: 
Preschool enrolment 
Lin. Prob. (no IV)  
(1) 
Probit (no IV)  
(3) 
Lin prob (no IV)  
(4) 
2S IV  
(5) 
2S IV (Girls only) 
(6) 
2S IV (Boys only)  
(7) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Programme variables             
Participation .174 .036*** .703 .159*** .213 .051*** .214 .071*** .146 .107 .215 .113* 
Programme village .204 .057*** 1.451 .379*** .444 .158*** .443 .075*** .572 .092*** .368 .110*** 
             
Child characteristics             
Sex  .024 .027 .111 .124 .036 .039 .023 .041     
Age .027 .014* .114 .073 .037 .023 .041 .023 .053 .033 .037 .032 
             
Household char.             
SC/ST -.018 .064 -.445 .421 -.133 .143 -.129 .118 .050 .204 -.301 .155 
OBC .052 .056 .022 .410 -.004 .141 -.012 .116 -.160 .192 -.162 .152 
Muslim -.007 .069 -.621 .550 -.169 .183 -.174 .130 -.029 .211 -.348 .174 
Household education .011 .011 .032 .054 .010 .017 .010 .016 -.007 .027 -.024 .020 
Female education .001 .013 -.073 .056 -.024 .018 -.020 .018 .001 .030 -.047 .031 
Income quintile -.002 .012 .039 .069 -.008 .021 -.006 .017 -.025 .026 .002 .026 
Female head of h.h. -.089 .050* -.266 .320 -.070 .104 -.070 .111 .096 .136   
Household size .001 .006 .033 .029 .008 .009 .007 .008 .006 .014 .002 .011 
Dependency ratio .019 .025 .201 .116* .063 .034* .054 .029* .085 .047* .017 .041 
             
Community char.             
Distance to town -.000 .003 -.008 .015 -.002 .005 -.003 .003 .003 .006 -.008 .004** 
Village development  .096 .129 -.448 .656 -.147 .204 -.226 .120* -.066 .023** -.351 .157** 
# preschools .178 .040*** .478 .350 .134 .117 .169 .060** .196 .084 .115 .085 
1991 village literacy  .002 .002 -.000 .010 -.000 .003 .001 .002 .001 .004 .000 .003 
Sitamarhi district .139 .110 1.670 .572*** .495 .180*** .537 .111*** .496 .154*** .571 .153*** 
Darbhanga district -.249 .099** -.563 .256** -.205 .152 -.195 .088** -.149 .139 -.224 .120* 
Block variables             
# obs 1002  510  518  509  247  262  
R-squared .272    .298  .307  .319  .344  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2S IV estimations.
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Table 17. School enrolment with different estimations methods 
Dependent variable: 
School enrolment 
Probit (no IV) 
(1) 
Probit (no IV) 
(1) 
Lin prob (no IV) 
(2) 
2S IV 
(3) 
2S IV – GIRLS  
(4) 
2S IV – BOYS  
(5) 
2S IV – 
SC/ST  
(6) 
   Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Programme variables               
Participation .298 .086*** .304 .085*** .072 .023*** .145 .036*** .111 .060* .181 .042*** .091 .081 
Programme village -.059 .124 .324 .204 .081 .056 .046 .034 .170 .061*** -.051 .045 .202 .099** 
Int. village & literacy   -.030 .012** -.007 .003** -.007 .002*** -.010 .003*** -.005 .003* -.013 .004*** 
              
Child characteristics               
Sex  -.339 .087*** -.338 .088*** -.085 .023*** -.084 .017***     -.044 .034 
Age .069 .015*** .069 .015*** .017 .004*** .018 .004*** .022 .005*** .015 .005*** .026 .009*** 
Preschool .177 .109 .169 .111 .055 .027** .050 .019*** .032 .029 .056 .027** .032 .040 
Household characteristics              
SC/ST -.480 .187** -.451 .194** -.089 .045** -.100 .034*** -.083 .052 -.124 .041***   
OBC -.299 .163* -.299 .170* -.045 .032 -.053 .029* -.080 .045* -.032 .034   
Muslim -.366 .181** -.351 .188* -.064 .045 -.062 .034* -.046 .053 .075 .043*   
Household education .135 .030*** .133 .030*** .036 .008*** .035 .006*** .041 .009*** .031 .008*** .028 .012** 
Female education .096 .047** .098 .048** .008 .007 .007 .006 .022 .009** -.006 .008 -.005 .022 
Income quintile .158 .036*** .156 .036*** .041 .010*** .042 .008*** .037 .011*** .043 .010*** .056 .014*** 
Female hh head -.149 .199 -.154 .202 -.030 .057 -.034 .038 -.060 .058 .000 .050 -.151 .091 
Household size -.036 .017** -.035 .017** -.007 .004* -.006 .003** -.008 .005 -.005 .004 -.014 .008* 
Dependency ratio .012 .060 .007 .059 -.001 .017 -.005 .014 .008 .020 -.014 .017 .032 .028 
              
Community characteristics              
Distance to town .004 .009 .004 .009 .001 .002 .000 .001 .001 .002 .001 .001 .002 .003 
# primary schools -.106 .068 -.081 .070 -.026 .020 -.024 .013* -.028 .020 -.024 .017 -.019 .021 
Child wage -.004 .007 -.001 .007 .000 .002 -.000 .001 .001 .002 -.001 .002 -.001 .003 
Village development  -.176 .315 -.314 .319 -.065 .080 -.071 .044 -.099 .069 -.055 .059 -.225 .132* 
1991 village literacy  .002 .005 .024 .011** .006 .003** .006 .003** .009 .005** .004 .002 .010 .006* 
Block/district  variables             
# obs 2447  2447  2447 2423  1104  1319  655  
R-squared     .138 .132  .148  .123  .131  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2S IV estimations.
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Table 18.  Overview of estimated treatment effects, including Propensity Score Matching results 
 
  Probit 
(marginal 
effect) 
 
 
 
(i) 
Linear 
prob.  
(no IV) 
 
 
 
(ii) 
2SLS with 
IV 
 
 
 
 
(iii) 
Total 
village 
estimation  
(lin. prob.) 
 
 
(iv) 
PSM 
(part. vs. 
non-part.) 
 
 
 
(v) 
PSM 
(part. / 
non-part. 
vs. 
matched 
control) 
(vi) 
IMMUNIZATION        
Tuberculosis  Participation .076 
(.025)*** 
.084 
(.027)*** 
.205 
(.027)*** 
  .088 
(.026)*** 
.202 
(.026)*** 
 Village .193 
(.054)*** 
.204 
(.083)** 
.149 
(.049)*** 
.195 
(.113)* 
 .108 
(.025)*** 
        
Polio Participation .004 
(.000)*** 
.007 
(.015) 
  .009 
(.017) 
.018 
(.019) 
 Village -.013 
(.001)*** 
-.008 
(.032) 
 -.008 
(.041) 
 .004 
(.018) 
        
DTP Participation .089 
(.029)*** 
.097 
(.026)*** 
.209 
(.028)*** 
 .100 
(.023)*** 
.203 
(.028)*** 
 Village .164 
(.053)*** 
.172 
(.067)** 
.122 
(.050)** 
.160 
(.100) 
 .090 
(.023)*** 
        
Measles  Participation .085 
(.026)*** 
.092 
(.027)*** 
.185 
(.027)*** 
 .085 
(.025)*** 
.220 
(.026)*** 
 Village .262 
(.100)*** 
.309 
(.084)*** 
.268 
(.050)*** 
.296 
(.112)** 
 .089 
(.024)*** 
PRESCHOOL        
(only villages with at 
least one preschool)) 
Participation .212 
(.053)*** 
.213 
(.051)*** 
.214 
(.071)*** 
 .164 
(.061)*** 
.340 
(.080)*** 
 Village .344 
(.167)** 
.444 
(.158)*** 
.443 
(.075)*** 
.382*** 
(.068) 
 .185 
(.067)*** 
SCHOOL51        
School  (total) Participation .069 
(.035)** 
.072 
(.023)*** 
.145 
(.036)*** 
 .077 
(.027)*** 
.114 
(.031)*** 
 Village .089 
(.035*** 
.081 
(.056) 
.046 
(.034) 
.124 
(.050)** 
 .056 
(.031)* 
        
School  (girls) Participation .062 
(.030)** 
.063 
(.029)*** 
.111 
(.060)* 
 .099 
(.038)*** 
.144 
(.043)*** 
 Village .185 
(.064)** 
.238 
(.096)*** 
.170 
(.061)*** 
.178 
(.072)** 
 .139 
(.042)*** 
        
School  (boys) Participation .078 
(.042)* 
.082 
(.029)*** 
.181 
(.042)*** 
 .067 
(.033)** 
.202 
(.042)*** 
 Village .001 
(.000) 
-.020 
(.058) 
-.051 
(.045) 
.083 
(.062) 
 .051 
(.037) 
 
• Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. Results for IV and PSM are 
bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
• *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01  
 
 
 
                                                          
51 All regression estimates for impact on school enrolment include an interaction term between 
programme village and 1991 village female literacy rates. 
